Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
 

"Congressional Apportionment and The Fourteenth Amendment," (working paper).

"Success at the Constitutional Convention," with Aaron Hitefield, (working paper).

"Electing the President: A monte carlo study of plurality rule and the electoral college,"(working paper).

"Creating Parties in Congress: The Emergence of a Social Network," Political Research Quarterly, (forthcoming).
   Replication Data.

"Slavery in the Constitution: Why the Lower South Occassionally Succeeded at the Constitutional Convention," Political Research Quarterly, (forthcoming).
   Replication Data.

"Coalitional Instability and the Three-Fifths Compromise," with Gordon Ballingrud, American Journal of Political Science, 2018, 62(4): 861-72.
   Replication Data.

"The Consistency of James Madison's Politics," with Robert Cooper, American Political Thought, 2017, 6(2), 201-227.
   Also of interest is a narrative comparing Madison and his Contemporaries as well a response to Kukla in American Political Thought, 2018, 7(1), 155-157.

"Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress," with Michael Lynch and Tony Madonna, American Politics Review, 2014, 42(4): 600-27.

"A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, Journal of Economic History, 2013, 73(2): 407-44.

"Constitutional Change and American Pivotal Politics," with Justin Moeller, American Political Research, 2012, 40(6): 1092-1120.

"A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on all Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention, with Jac Heckelman, Paul Carlsen, and David Gelman, Historical Methods, 2012, 45(3): 135-141.

"Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes," with Jac Heckelman, Public Finance Review, 2010, 38 (6): 738-61.

"Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention: New Tests of the Beard Thesis," with Jac Heckelman, Cliometrica, 2010, 4 (2): 207-228.

"Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule," with Julian Edward, Journal of Politics, 2009, 71(2): 733-47.

"An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783," Social Science History, 2009, 33(1): 47-74.
   Also of interest are data on French Soldiers in Aid of the American Revolution.

"Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, Public Choice, 2008, 136 (3-4): 293-313.
   Awarded the Gordon Tullock prize for best paper by younger authors in 2008.

"An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited," with Jac Heckelman, The Journal of Economic History, 2007, 67(4): 829-48.

"A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, American Political Science Review, 2006, 100(2): 297-302.

"Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation," with Michael Cain, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, 11(2): 233-260.

"Public Goods and Private Interests: An explanation for state compliance with federal requisitions, 1775-1789," in Jac Heckelman et. al. eds. Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic History. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1999.

"Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation," with Michael Cain, Public Choice, 1997, 90: 201-213.