To request a copy of this paper, please e-mail: [email protected].
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| Keith L. Dougherty | |||||||
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Abstract. This paper examines the coalitional stability of apportionment rules considered for the Fourteenth Amendment assuming Congress limited itself to the seven rules proposed. Using each state's vote share under the seven rules of apportionment as a measure of state preference for various apportionment schemes, we find that the stability of legislative apportionment depended upon which states were seated in Congress as well as the voting threshold { majority, two-thirds, or three-fourths. Among all states, all seven proposals were in a top cycle under majority rule. With only Northern and Border states seated (the case of the 39th Congress) apportionment based on the electoral quali cations specified by each state was in equilibrium while whole population without disenfranchised males (the apportionment rule in the Fourteenth Amendment) was a Condorcet loser or near Condorcet loser in the Senate and House, respectively. Given these conditions, it is surprising that equal apportionment was proposed by two-thirds of Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the states.
To request a copy of this paper, please e-mail: [email protected].
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| Last Modified: 6/1/20 | |||||||
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| Keith L. Dougherty | Department of Political Science | SPIA | University of Georgia |