To request a copy of this paper, please e-mail: [email protected].
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| Keith L. Dougherty | |||||||
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Abstract. This paper compares the performance of the electoral college and plurality rule on four voting criteria separately: the Condorcet winner criterion, the Condorcet loser criterion, independence of eliminated alternatives, and state responsiveness (the later is new to this paper). It also examines majority rule with a runoff, Borda count, and approval voting. The comparisons are conducted using monte carlo simulations of past presidential elections (currently 2004) and an impartial culture condition. Preliminary results suggest that majority rule with a runoff performs best on the two Condorcet criteria, Independence of Eliminated Alternatives produces more mixed results, and the Borda Count performs best on the state responsiveness criterion for the 35 largest states. With the exception of its performance on the state responsiveness criterion for small states under the impartial culture condition and one case of independence of eliminated alternatives, the electoral college always performs worse than another voting rule. Further study should help institutional framers determine which voting rule is more desirable for electing U.S. Presidents.
To request a copy of this paper, please e-mail: [email protected].
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| Last Modified: 8/1/12 | |||||||
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| Keith L. Dougherty | Department of Political Science | SPIA | University of Georgia |