The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design, with Julian Edward, New York: Springer, 2011.
 

"The Probability of Violating Arrow's Conditions," with Jac Heckelman (working paper).

"Congressional Apportionment and The Fourteenth Amendment," (working paper).

"Success at the Constitutional Convention," with Aaron Hitefield, (working paper).

"Electing the President: A monte carlo study of plurality rule and the electoral college,"(working paper).

"The Optimal Quorum" (working paper).

"Stopping Rules for Majority Voting: A Public Choice Experiment," with Alice Kisaalita, Jordan McKissick, and Evan Katz. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, (forthcoming).

"Slavery in the Constitution: Why the Lower South Occassionally Succeeded at the Constitutional Convention," Political Research Quarterly, (forthcoming).
   Replication Data.

"Coalitional Instability and the Three-Fifths Compromise," with Gordon Ballingrud, American Journal of Political Science, 2018, 62(4): 861-72.
   Replication Data.

"An Expected Utility Analysis of the Optimal k-majority Rule," with Robi Ragan, Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, 27(3): 332-53.

"A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, Journal of Economic History, 2013, 73(2): 407-44.

"Constitutional Change and American Pivotal Politics," with Justin Moeller, American Political Research, 2012, 40(6): 1092-1120.

"A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on all Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention, with Jac Heckelman, Paul Carlsen, and David Gelman, Historical Methods, 2012, 45(3): 135-141.

"Voting for Pareto Optimality: a multidimensional analysis," with Julian Edward, Public Choice, 2012, 151(3): 655-678.

"Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes," with Jac Heckelman, Public Finance Review, 2010, 38 (6): 738-61.

"Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention: New Tests of the Beard Thesis," with Jac Heckelman, Cliometrica, 2010, 4 (2): 207-228.

"The Properties of Simple vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases where Absences and Abstentions are Important," with Julian Edward, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010, 22 (1): 85-122.

"Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule," with Julian Edward, Journal of Politics, 2009, 71(2): 733-47.

"Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, Public Choice, 2008, 136 (3-4): 293-313.
   Awarded the Gordon Tullock prize for best paper by younger authors in 2008.

"An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited," with Jac Heckelman, The Journal of Economic History, 2007, 67(4): 829-48.

"A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, American Political Science Review, 2006, 100(2): 297-302.

"A Non-Equilibrium Analysis of Unanimity Rule, Majority Rule, and two Pareto Concepts," with Julian Edward, Economic Inquiry, 2005, 43(4): 855-864.

"The Pareto efficiency and expected costs of k-majority rules," with Julian Edward, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2004, 3(2): 161-189.

"Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation," with Michael Cain, Public Choice, 1997, 90: 201-213.