home research classes vitae teach  
  Keith L. Dougherty
  Professor
 
  Research: Formal Modeling
 
 

The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design, with Julian Edward, New York: Springer, 2011.
 

"The Probability of Violating Arrow's Conditions," with Jac Heckelman (working paper).

"The Probability of Sen`s Liberal Paradox," with Julian Edward (working paper).

"Electing the President: A monte carlo study of plurality rule and the electoral college,"(working paper).

"The Optimal Quorum" (working paper).

"Stopping Rules for Majority Voting: A Public Choice Experiment," with Alice Kisaalita, Jordan McKissick, and Evan Katz. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, (forthcoming).

"An Expected Utility Analysis of the Optimal k-majority Rule," with Robi Ragan, Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, 27(3): 332-53.

"The Value of Formalism: Re-Examining External Costs and Decision Costs with Multiple Groups," with Julian Edward and Robi Ragan, Public Choice, 2015, 163(1-2): 31-52.

"An Experimental Study of the Efficiency of Unanimity Rule and Majority Rule," with Brian Pitts, Justin Moeller, and Robert Ragan, Public Choice, 2014, 158(3): 359-382.

"Voting for Pareto Optimality: a multidimensional analysis," with Julian Edward, Public Choice, 2012, 151(3): 655-678.

"The Properties of Simple vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases where Absences and Abstentions are Important," with Julian Edward, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010, 22 (1): 85-122.

"Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule," with Julian Edward, Journal of Politics, 2009, 71(2): 733-47.

"A Non-Equilibrium Analysis of Unanimity Rule, Majority Rule, and two Pareto Concepts," with Julian Edward, Economic Inquiry, 2005, 43(4): 855-864.

"The Pareto efficiency and expected costs of k-majority rules," with Julian Edward, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2004, 3(2): 161-189.

"Public Goods Theory: eighteenth century political philosophy to twentieth century economics," Public Choice, 2003, 117: 239-253.

 

 

 

 
Last Modified: 6/1/20