

INTL 6200 Fall 2025  
Pre-Seminar in International Relations  
Dr. Jeffrey D. Berejikian  
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Class Meeting: Thursday Weds. 9:10 – 12:20 pm - 115 Candler Hall  
Office Hours: 3:30-5:30 Tuesdays.  
(Make appointments via: <https://jeffreyberejikian.youcanbook.me/> )

## **Course Introduction**

This seminar serves as an introduction to the study of international relations (IR) for Master of International Policy (MIP) students in the Department of International Affairs. Its primary objective is to establish a strong conceptual and theoretical foundation for advanced coursework in the field. Rather than delving deeply into any single issue, the course provides a broad survey of the key topics, debates, and analytical approaches that define the discipline. By the end of the semester, students will have developed a solid understanding of the core conceptual and empirical underpinnings of IR and will be equipped with the critical tools necessary to evaluate their relevance and applicability to real-world policy challenges.

Specifically, these readings and assignments are designed to fulfill the “Mastery of IR Scholarship” core learning outcome in the MIP program. “Students must demonstrate a practical understanding of the dominant theories and approaches to studying international relations, as well as develop in-depth knowledge of the historical and contemporary international relations literature.”

Please note that this iteration of the course incorporates a shift in emphasis. Over the past several decades, IR scholarship has moved away from grand theory toward more focused, “middle-level” theories aimed at producing concrete empirical progress. However, traditional grand theories and frameworks—such as political realism and liberalism, debates on hegemonic decline, nationalism (including populist politics), liberal economic interdependence, and nuclear deterrence—are once again gaining prominence. Increasingly, these older frameworks are invoked by political elites and decision-makers as tools for both policy formulation and shaping public opinion.

A striking development in the study of IR is that many of these classic frameworks, developed in a different era, are now being selectively applied in ways that often do not align fully with the current global context. While change is a constant in the study of international relations, contemporary discourse and events are, in several respects, pulling us “backward in time” conceptually.

A central goal of this course, therefore, is to analyze where and how this reversion is occurring and to consider how or if venerable concepts and frameworks might be updated and refined to more accurately reflect today’s global realities, or if they should be abandoned altogether.

## **Course Requirements:**

There are several writing assignments in this class. They each serve the singular purpose of cultivating an ability to summarize and synthesize scholarly research. This is a critical professional skill that can

only be obtained through regular practice and consistent feedback. The writing assignments are deliberately “stacked” such that you will begin with short assignments and work your way to developing a significant essay.

You are encouraged to fold your specific substantive interests into all of your written work and to critically reflect on whether or not the frameworks discussed in class advance our understanding.

- **200 points (total) Short Comparison Essays** -You will complete five (5) short comparison essays, each worth 40 points. For each essay, you must compare and contrast readings from any two weeks of the course. The objective is to promote critical thinking and the integration of concepts as the course progresses. This assignment structure prevents you from frontloading or backloading your work.
  1. Each essay must compare one previous week with the current week (e.g., in week 4, compare weeks 1, 2, or 3 with week 4). You may not use the same week more than once. Essays are due before class in the week containing the most recent readings analyzed. No exceptions—plan ahead. Each essay must incorporate *all* assigned readings from the selected weeks.
  2. Essays must clearly and *concisely* summarize each reading. Then, the primary focus should be on evaluating the practical policy applications of the readings. Conceptually similar readings can/should be discussed together. You may choose any conceptual dimension(s) you like to organize your essay. While weekly topics often relate to specific subjects, you are free to apply course concepts to a broader set of contemporary policy issues. The goal is to produce a coherent, integrated framework, argument, or analysis rooted in course concepts.
  3. Essay length is 1,500 words (+/- 5%).
- **200 points (total) Review Essays** –You will write (2) analytical essays (3,000-3,500 words). These essays are to be synthetic and critical. The model for these assignments is akin to a literature review in which you use assigned and supplemental readings to, for example, make an affirmative argument, derive a research question, critique an established theory/concept. Review essays must cover topics from *at least* three weeks. You are strongly encouraged to incorporate the supplemental readings your essays. Review essays are due at 12:00 pm before class. Do not submit a weekly summary on the week you submit a review essay.

Note: your shorter comparison essays will be an important resource for completing this assignment. For guidance on how the various purposes of a literature review see: Knopf, Jeffrey W. "Doing a literature review." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 39, no. 1 (2006): 127-132.

- **250 points In-class Final.** You will write an in-class summary exam. The nature of the exam is designed to mimic the format of a preliminary field exam, with the important exception that the class exam is open book. Students will be permitted 5 pages of printed notes for the exam. Exam questions will ask you to synthesize and contextualize the major approaches to the study of international relations.

Note: your weekly summaries, review essays, and class notes will be a critical resource for this assignment.

In addition, there are three participation components.

- **100 points Discussion Questions.** You will submit three (3) discussion questions each week. No more than one question per reading. In class bring two copies, one for me (due at beginning of class) and one for you to reference during our discussions. We will use these to support the seminar each week. Discussion questions can focus on how the readings relate to (or contradict) one another, critiques the of arguments and assumptions, or critically evaluate the practical utility of the research. In addition, direct questions about parts of readings that may be unclear or confusing are also encouraged. Do not submit questions for sessions where you are assigned discussion lead. I will conduct a summative evaluation of all questions at the end of the semester.
- **150 points Discussion Lead.** Students, working in pre-assigned teams, will have primary responsibility for lead a seminar session. Discussion leaders will provide a brief overview of each reading under their responsibility. Summaries should include the main argument, research approach, and findings. Leaders will also facilitate a discussion on questions from the class, generate their own topics, and will be responsible for moderating our review and critique of each of the readings. Discussion lead teams will be evaluated on the degree to which their mastery of the material allows them to propel the discussion and address class questions.

Important notes: 1) Teams are expected to collaborate and integrate their presentations in every respect. Submit any presentation materials – e.g. Slide deck, supplemental readings, assignments, etc., - to ELC prior to the class session. 2) Teams are encouraged to us AI to assist in production of their presentation materials. A brief footnote at the end of the presentation will summarize how AI assisted, and which model was used.

- **100 points Seminar Participation.** Active class participation is not optional. Each week, I will evaluate participation based on the following factors: the frequency with which a student participates in discussion, the degree to which comments and questions contribute positively to the discussion, and the extent to which comments demonstrate a thoughtful consideration of the week's readings. *Students should avoid attempting to dominate the discussion with their comments and focus instead on engaging their colleagues in dialogue.* While there is no formal attendance policy, the criteria for participation cannot be met without attending regularly.

### Grading Scale

A 100-93; A- 92-90; B+ 89-87; B 86- 83; B- 82-80; C+ 79-77; C 76-73; C- 72-70; D 69-60; F 59 and below

### Seminar Schedule and Reading List

There are two approaches to developing a reading list for a graduate seminar like this. One is to attempt a (more or less) comprehensive set of readings on a given topic each week. The other is to present a smaller, focused set of readings. Each approach involves tradeoffs. For example, a comprehensive approach incentivizes “skim reading.” I believe this approach affects the quality of in-class discussion. I have instead opted to offer a smaller set of required readings each week with the expectation that students will read all the assigned material thoroughly. *Each student's participation score*

*will reflect the degree to which this expectation is met.* The schedule below also includes a set of supplemental readings. These are provided for those who wish to pursue a topic in greater detail. Students are also encouraged to consider and incorporate elements of the supplemental readings into written assignments. Note also that supplemental readings, where listed, may be useful when you lead a discussion and in crafting your essays.

All readings are available on-line via the UGA library portal. The materials cost for this class is \$0.00

Finally, this is a topical course. However, a historical grounding in how IR scholars think about the subfield and the scientific project is critical. The readings below, while not mandatory, are recommended.

- Mearsheimer, John J, and Stephen M Walt. 2013. “Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing is Bad for International Relations.” *European Journal of International Relations* 19(3): 427–457.
- Healy, Kieran. 2017. Fuck Nuance. *Sociological Theory* 35(2):118-127.
- Bynam, Daniel, and Matthew Kroenig. 2016. “Reaching Beyond the Ivory Tower”. *International Security* 25(2):289-319.
- Eun, Y. S. (2019). An intellectual confession from a member of the “non-white” IR community: a friendly reply to David Lake’s “White Man’s IR”. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 52(1), 78-84.
- King, Gary, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton University Press, 1994, (especially Chapters 1, 3, and 6).
- Bennett, Andrew. “The Mother of All isms: Causal Mechanisms and Structured Pluralism in International Relations Theory.” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 459–481.
- Lakatos, Imre. 1970. Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In
- *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, edited by Imre Lakatos, and Alan Musgrave, 91-196. Cambridge:
- Cambridge University Press
- Singer, J. David. 1969. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. In *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, edited by Klaus Knorr, and Sidney Verba, 77-92. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lake, David A. 2011. “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress.” *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2): 465-480.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland Press, 1979 (specifically, Chapter 1)

## **Week 1 – Aug 13: Preliminaries**

- Review Syllabus and assignments
- Set presentation schedule
- Summarize framework orientation to the course and material

## Week 2 – Aug 20: Practical Scholarship?

- Avey, P. C., & Desch, M. C. (2014). What do policymakers want from us? Results of a survey of current and former senior national security decision makers. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(2), 227-246.
- Avey, P. C., Desch, M. C., Parajon, E., Peterson, S., Powers, R., & Tierney, M. J. (2022). Does social science inform foreign policy? Evidence from a survey of US national security, trade, and development officials. *International Studies Quarterly*, 66(1), sqab057.
- Avant, D. (2022) "Five Lessons for Responsible Engagement when the World is on Fire" <https://www.duckofminerva.com/2022/09/five-lessons-for-responsible-engagement-when-the-world-is-on-fire.html>

### Supplemental

- Walt, S. M. (2005). The relationship between theory and policy in international relations. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 8(1), 23-48.

## Week 3 – Aug 27: Structural/Offensive Realism

- Mearsheimer, J. "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power" in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2021). The inevitable rivalry: America, China, and the tragedy of great-power politics. *Foreign Aff.*, 100, 48.
- Zhang, S. (2022). Rise of China and its behaviours in the South China Sea: an analysis of defensive realism perspective. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)*, 6(1), 286-306.
- Smith, N. R., & Dawson, G. (2022). Mearsheimer, realism, and the Ukraine war. *Analyse & Kritik*, 44(2), 175-200.

[discussion note: do you accept the assumption that all great powers are inherently expansionist?]

### Supplemental

- Edinger, H. (2022). Offensive ideas: structural realism, classical realism and Putin's war on Ukraine. *International Affairs*, 98(6), 1873-1893.
- Snyder, G. H. (2014). Mearsheimer's world: Offensive realism and the struggle for security. In *The Realism Reader* (pp. 188-196). Routledge.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2007. "Structural realism." *International relations theories: Discipline and diversity* 83 (2007): 77-94.
- Amao, O. B. (2019). The foreign policy and intervention behaviour of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa: A structural realist analysis. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(1), 93-112.
- Edinger, H. (2022). Offensive ideas: structural realism, classical realism and Putin's war on Ukraine. *International Affairs*, 98(6), 1873-1893.
- Grafoy, D. (2019). Offensive versus Defensive Realism: Russia's Policy of Countering the United States in Syria and Beyond. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 12(3), 21-40.

- Taliaferro, J. W. (2000). Security seeking under anarchy: Defensive realism revisited. *International security*, 25(3), 128-161.
- Lynch, A. C. (2001). The realism of Russia's foreign policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53(1), 7-31.

#### **Week 4 - Sept 3: Hegemony and Decline**

- Gilpin, R. (1988). The theory of hegemonic war. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4), 591-613. (note: read with an eye to current circumstances)
- Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2015). The rise and fall of the great powers in the twenty-first century: China's rise and the fate of America's global position. *International security*, 40(3), 7-53.
- Goddard, S. E. (2025). The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition: Trump's New Spheres of Influence. *Foreign Aff.*, 104, 8.
- Zakaria, F. (2019). The self-destruction of American power. *Foreign Affairs*, 98(4), 10-16.

#### *Supplemental*

- Boswell, T., & Sweat, M. (1991). Hegemony, long waves, and major wars: A time series analysis of systemic dynamics, 1496-1967. *International Studies Quarterly*, 123-149.
- Lee, B. T. F., Bettani, S. A., & Sims, J. P. (2024). Rise of China: Hegemony or harmony?. *Chinese Political Science Review*, 9(3), 381-417.
- Bello, W. (2024). Overextension and globalization: The dynamics of hegemonic decline. *Critical Sociology*, 08969205241266982.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*. Vintage, 2010.
- Modelski, G. (1978). The long cycle of global politics and the nation-state. *Comparative studies in society and history*, 20(2), 214-235.

#### **Week 5 - Sept 10: Neoclassical Realism (APSA)**

- Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. *World politics*, 51(1), 144-172.
- Mallett, E., & Juneau, T. (2023). A neoclassical realist theory of overbalancing. *Global Studies Quarterly*, 3(2), ksad023.
- Schweller, R. L. (2004). Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing. *International Security*, 29(2), 159-201

#### *Supplemental:*

- Martill, B., & Sus, M. (2024). Winds of change? Neoclassical realism, foreign policy change, and European responses to the Russia-Ukraine War. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 13691481241280170.
- Berejikian, J. D. (2018). David versus Goliath: Risk and Weaker State Confrontation. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14(3), 326-345.

## Week 6 - Sept 17: Rationalist Explanations for War

- Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. *International organization*, 49(3), 379-414.
- Lebow, R. N. (2022). International relations theory and the Ukrainian war. *Analyse & Kritik*, 44(1), 111-135.
- Gartzke, E. (1999). War is in the Error Term. *International Organization*, 53(3), 567-587.

### Supplemental

- Lake, D. A. (2010). Two cheers for bargaining theory: Assessing rationalist explanations of the Iraq War. *International Security*, 35(3), 7-52.
- Quek, K. (2017). Rationalist experiments on war. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 5(1), 123-142.
- McKoy, M. K., & Lake, D. A. (2011). Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War. *International Security*, 36(3), 172-178.

## Week 7 - Sept 24: Democratic Peace

- Owen, J. M. 1994. How liberalism produces democratic peace. *International security*, 19(2), 87-125.
- Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. *The American Political Science Review* 97(4):585-602.
- Carnegie, A., Kertzer, J. D., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2023). Democratic peace and covert military force: An experimental test. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 67(2-3), 235-265.
- Tomz, M. R., & Weeks, J. L. 2013. Public opinion and the democratic peace. *American political science review*, 107(4), 849-865.

### Supplemental

- Layne, C. (1994). Kant or cant: The myth of the democratic peace. *International security*, 19(2), 5-49
- Gartzke, E. (2000). Preferences and the democratic peace. *International Studies Quarterly*, 44(2), 191-212.
- Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946- 1986. *The American Political Science Review* 87(3):624-38.
- Gartzke, E. (1998). Kant we all just get along? Opportunity, willingness, and the origins of the democratic peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1-27.
- Kinsella, D. (2005). No rest for the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 453-457
- Russett, B., Layne, C., Spiro, D. E., & Doyle, M. W. 1995. The democratic peace. *International Security*, 19(4), 164-184.
- Owsiak, A. P. 2019. Foundations for integrating the democratic and territorial peace arguments. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 36(1), 63-87.
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2012. *The Territorial Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kant, Immanuel. 1957. *Perpetual Peace*. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
- McDonald, Patrick J. 2015. Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace. *International Organization* 69(3):557-588.

## Week 8 – Oct 1: Domestic Audiences

- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42(3):427-60.
- Weeks, J. L., & Crunkilton, C. (2017). Domestic constraints on foreign policy in authoritarian systems. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *The American Political Science Review* 88(3):577-92.
- Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization* 62(1):35-64.

### Supplemental:

- Kertzer, J. D., & Brutger, R. (2016). Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the audience back into audience cost theory. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1), 234-249.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51(4): 513–553
- Martin, Lisa L. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton University Press.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation Through Agent Specific Punishments." *International Organization* 54(4): 809-824.
- Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (1): 25-52.

## Week 9 - Oct. 8: Securitization

- Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). 'Securitization' revisited: Theory and cases. *International relations*, 30(4), 494-531.
- Lahav, G., & Courtemanche, M. (2012). The ideological effects of framing threat on immigration and civil liberties. *Political Behavior*, 34(3), 477-505.
- Skinner, I. W. (2025). How security framing creates disagreement in public opinion: evidence from US refugee policy. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 1-20.
- Rushton, S. (2010). Framing AIDS: securitization, development-ization, rights-ization. *Global health governance*, 4(1).

### Supplemental

- Balzacq, T. (2011). Securitization theory. *How security problems emerge and dissolve*.
- Vultee, F. (2010). Securitization: A new approach to the framing of the "war on terror". *Journalism practice*, 4(1), 33-47.



- Colomé-Menéndez, D., Koops, J. A., & Weggemans, D. (2021). A country of immigrants no more? The securitization of immigration in the National Security Strategies of the United States of America. *Global Affairs*, 7(1), 1-26.

### **Week 10 – Oct 15: Trade and Conflict.**

- McMillan, S. M. (1997). Interdependence and conflict. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(Supplement\_1), 33-58.
- Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. M. (1997). The classical liberals were right: Democracy, interdependence, and conflict, 1950–1985. *International studies quarterly*, 41(2), 267-293.
- Nye Jr, J. S. (2020). Power and interdependence with China. *The Washington Quarterly*, 43(1), 7-21.
- McDonagh, N. (2025). US-China competition, world order and economic decoupling: insights from cultural realism. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 79(3), 364–384. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2025.2471353>

#### **Supplemental**

- Cha, V. D. (2023). Collective resilience: Deterring China's weaponization of economic interdependence. *International Security*, 48(1), 91-124.
- Oppenheimer, H. (2025). Digital Interdependence and Power Politics. *British Journal of Political Science*, 55, e93.
- McMillan, S. M. (1997). Interdependence and conflict. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(Supplement\_1), 33-58.
- Barbieri, K. (1996). Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict?. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1), 29-49.

### **Week 11 – Oct 22: Populism and Foreign Policy**

- Destradi, S., Plagemann, J., & Taş, H. (2022). Populism and the politicisation of foreign policy. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 24(3), 475-492.
- Boucher, J. C., & Thies, C. G. (2019). “I am a tariff man”: The power of populist foreign policy rhetoric under President Trump. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(2), 712-722.
- Lacatus, C. (2021). Populism and President Trump’s approach to foreign policy: An analysis of tweets and rally speeches. *Politics*, 41(1), 31-47.
- Levi, Y., & Agmon, S. (2021). Beyond culture and economy: Israel’s security-driven populism. *Contemporary Politics*, 27(3), 292-315.

#### **Supplemental:**

- Wajner, D. F., & Giurlando, P. (2024). Populist foreign policy: mapping the developing research program on populism in international relations. *International Studies Review*, 26(1), viae012.
- de Moraes, R. F. (2023). Demagoguery, populism, and foreign policy rhetoric: evidence from Jair Bolsonaro’s tweets. *Contemporary Politics*, 29(2), 249-275.

- Taş, H. (2022). Continuity through change: populism and foreign policy in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 43(12), 2869-2887
- Giurlando, P., & Wajner, D. F. (Eds.). (2023). *Populist Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives of Populism in the International Scene*. Springer Nature.
- Wicaksana, I. G. W., & Wardhana, A. (2021). Populism and foreign policy: The Indonesian case. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 13(3), 408-425.
- Wicaksana, I. G. W. (2022). Why does populism not make populist foreign policy? Indonesia under Jokowi. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 76(6), 634-652.
- Hall, J. (2021). In search of enemies: Donald Trump's populist foreign policy rhetoric. *Politics*, 41(1), 48-63

## Week 12 – Oct 29: Human Security in a Populist System

- Bos, L., Wichgers, L., & Van Spanje, J. (2023). Are populists politically intolerant? Citizens' populist attitudes and tolerance of various political antagonists. *Political Studies*, 71(3), 851-868.
- Rodríguez-Garavito, C., & Gomez, K. (2018). Responding to the populist challenge: a new playbook for the human rights field. *Rising to the populist challenge: a new playbook for the human rights actors*, 1, 11-53.
- Mégret, F. (2022). Human Rights Populism. *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, 13(2), 240-259
- Nurdin, A., Setiawan, A., & Nugraha, A. R. (2024). The Rise of Populism and Its Impact on Democratic Institutions: A Comparative Analysis of Global Trends. *International Journal of Social and Human*, 1(2), 67-84.

## Supplemental

- Alston, P. (2017). The populist challenge to human rights. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 9(1), 1-15.
- Marcos-Marne, H. (2022). The effects of basic human values on populist voting. An analysis of 13 European democracies. *Political Behavior*, 44(4), 1863-1881.
- Piterová, I., & Loziak, A. (2024). A comprehensive model for predicting populist attitudes. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 12(1), 73-88.

## Week 13 – Nov 5: Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence

- Peters, R., Anderson, J., & Menke, H. (2018). Deterrence in the 21st century: Integrating nuclear and conventional force. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 12(4), 15-43.
- McCue, J. R., Lowther, A., & Davis, J. (2023). A Tactical Nuclear Mindset. *Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower*, 2(2), 5-17.
- Becker, J. D. (2020). Strategy in the New Era of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 14(1), 117-140.

- Giles, Gregory. (2021) "Conventional-Nuclear Integration: Avoiding Misconceptions and Mistakes. *War on the Rocks*. <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/conventional-nuclear-integration-avoiding-misconceptions-and-mistakes/>

### Supplemental

- Payne, K. B. (2020). The great divide in US deterrence thought. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 14(2), 16-48.
- Mount, Adam and Pranay Vaddi (2020) "An integrated approach to deterrence posture: reviewing conventional and nuclear forces in a national defense strategy." *Federation of American Scientists*. <https://uploads.fas.org/2020/12/An-Integrated-Approach-to-Deterrence-Posture.pdf>

**Week 14 – Nov 12 “Dealers Choice” class selected topic**

**Readings TBD**

**Week 15 Nov 19: In-Class Final Exam**

### ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR STUDENTS:

The UGA Course Syllabus Policy requires me to include the following statement:  
“The course syllabus is a general plan for the course; deviation announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary.”

#### Accommodations

In accordance with UGA policy, “[s]tudents with disabilities who require reasonable accommodations in order to participate in course activities or meet course requirements should contact the instructor or designate during regular office hours or by appointment.” More information about accommodations that are available to students with disabilities is available from the [Disability Resource Center](#).

#### Academic Integrity and Professional Conduct

Please be aware of the University of Georgia’s policies on academic integrity and professional conduct. As a University of Georgia student, you have agreed to abide by the University’s academic honesty policy, “A Culture of Honesty,” and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards described in “A Culture of Honesty” found at: <https://honesty.uga.edu/Academic-Honesty-Policy/>. Lack of knowledge of the academic honesty policy is not a reasonable explanation for a violation. Questions related to course assignments, and the academic honesty policy should be directed to the instructor.

### **Well-being, Mental Health, and Student Support**

If you or someone you know needs assistance, you are encouraged to contact Student Care & Outreach in the Division of Student Affairs at 706-542-7774 or visit <https://sco.uga.edu/>. They will help you navigate any difficult circumstances you may be facing by connecting you with the appropriate resources or services. UGA has several resources to support your well-being and mental health: <https://well-being.uga.edu/>. Counseling and Psychiatric Services (CAPS) is your go-to, on-campus resource for emotional, social and behavioral-health support: <https://caps.uga.edu/>, TAO Online Support (<https://caps.uga.edu/tao/>), 24/7 support at 706-542-2273. For crisis support: <https://healthcenter.uga.edu/emergencies/>.

The University Health Center offers FREE workshops, classes, mentoring and health coaching led by licensed clinicians or health educators: <https://healthcenter.uga.edu/bewelluga/>

**In-Class Recordings:** In the absence of written authorization from the UGA Disability Resource Center, students may not make a visual or audio recording of any aspect of this course. Students who have a recording accommodation agree in writing that they:

- Will use the records only for personal academic use during the specific course. Understand that faculty members have copyright interest in their class lectures and that they agree not to infringe on this right in any way.
- Understand that the faculty member and students in the class have privacy rights and agree not to violate those rights by using recordings for any reason other than their own personal study.
- Will not release, digitally upload, broadcast, transcribe, or otherwise share all or any part of the recordings. They also agree that they will not profit financially and will not allow others to benefit personally or financially from lecture recordings or other course materials.
- Will erase/delete all recordings at the end of the semester.
- Understand that violation of these terms may subject them to discipline under the Student Code of Conduct or subject them to liability under copyright laws.