

INTL 4255: Nuclear Politics

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Class Hours: T Th 9:35-10:50 Room: Baldwin Hall 311

Course Description and Objectives

This seminar examines nuclear politics. We begin with a brief overview of nuclear science and technology, so that students gain a better understanding of how nuclear weapons work in practice. We then examine the states that have built nuclear weapons, as well as their motivations for doing so. The topic of proliferation and its various pathways (e.g., illicit proliferation, peaceful nuclear assistance, and covert programs) naturally follows and introduces yet another debate: how do nuclear weapons (and their proliferation) affect the nature of interstate conflict and the stability of international system? Here, we engage theories of deterrence, compellence, and counter-proliferation. Finally, we discuss cooperation with respect to nuclear materials, historical nonproliferation and arms control movements, and contemporary disarmament movements (e.g., Global Zero and the Nuclear Ban Treaty). Throughout the semester, we will also use numerous in-class exercises and simulations to highlight, experiment with, and experience course concepts.

Objectives

At the conclusion of this course, students will be (better) able to:

- Understand the science and technology underlying nuclear politics;
- Define and apply the key concepts used frequently in nuclear politics- for example, nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, interstate bargaining, deterrence, compellence, (non)proliferation, proliferation pathways, arms control, and disarmament;
- Identify which states choose (not) to build nuclear weapons and (not) to proliferate, and explain why they did (or did not do) so;
- Analyze how nuclear weapons affect bargaining, crisis diplomacy, conflict, and cooperation;
- Express an informed opinion on several contemporary debates (e.g., the effects of nuclear weapons on stability, the place of nuclear weapons in foreign policy, or whether to ban nuclear weapons altogether), using both theoretical arguments and evidence;

Required Materials

There are no required materials. All required readings are available through UGA Libraries, through either regular search or the course's academic reserve.

Course Structure

Grading

Your grade will be determined by:

- Final Paper (35%);
- Midterm brief (15%);
- Simulations/Activities (40%);
- Participation/Discussion Leaders (10%);

Grading Scale

A (93-100)	C+ (77-79.9)
A-(90-92.9)	C (73-76.9)
B+ (87-89.9)	C- (70-72.9)
B (83-86.69)	D (60-69.9)
B-(80-82.9)	FAIL (0-59.9)

Final Group Paper

For the final paper, you will have the option of write either (a) a research paper; or (b) a policy brief. Research papers have the goal of advancing knowledge of some phenomenon in the field, not necessarily with big concerns about how useful that knowledge could be in policymaking. Their focus is on the analysis, which should be methodologically sound and careful. Policy briefs have the goal of providing an assessment of some topic that is of direct relevance to a current policy issue. Although there is analysis involved in policy briefs as well, their focus is on analyzing specific scenarios, as well providing a synthesis of knowledge and evaluation of prospects for the future, all in a way that is relevant and actionable for policymakers. Groups of 2-3 people per paper. **DUE DECEMBER 13, at 11:59pm, via eLc**

Midterm brief

The midterm brief is a 1-2 page brief in which you will analyze either (a) some academic paper or book (either empirical or theoretic) on nuclear politics; or (b) some current news related to nuclear politics. The idea is for this assignment to be a simplified version of the final paper. I will use this to give feedback on your writing so you are better prepared for the final paper. Otimally you will choose closely related topics for the midterm brief and the final paper, but that is not

required, but I advise you to choose either option "a" for both or "b" for both. This assignment is individual only. **DUE OCTOBER 13, at 11:59pm, via eLc**

Simulations and Activities

There will be two simulations and one other experiential learning activity, involving historical sources, over the course of the semester. Attendance is essential those weeks. The nuclear crisis simulation will account for 10% of the grade, the Cuban Missile Crisis activity for another 10%, and the NPT Review Conference simulation, which will run for multiple weeks, for the remaining 20%.

Participation and Discussion Readers

As a general rule, lectures will start with some introduction of the content, but will mostly involve discussion of the readings. That means that your participation is crucial. Each reading will be assigned to one or two discussion leaders, that will be responsible to starting the discussion. This will be half the credit of this category (5%), with the remaining being for your participation in general.

Attendance

Attendance will not be taken, but be aware that too many absences can affect your participation grade, as well as your participation in the simulations.

Course Policies

Academic Integrity and Honesty

The UGA Student Honor Code states: "I will be academically honest in all of my academic work and will not tolerate academic dishonesty of others." A Culture of Honesty, the University's policies and procedures for handling cases of suspected dishonesty, can be assessed here: honesty.uga.edu. Any student caught cheating or plagiarizing will be referred to Judicial Affairs, as required by university policy.

Special Accommodations

- Students with disabilities that require accommodation should register with UGA's Disability Resource Center: drc.uga.edu, as well as warn me about those accommodations in the beginning of the semester.
- Students who need accommodation for religious or cultural reasons should check with me as soon as possible.

Student Resources

- The Office of Student Care & Outreach can provide assistance to students experiencing hardship- 706-542-7774 or by email sco@uga.edu

- Counseling and Psychiatric Services- 706-542-2273
- After Hour Mental Health Crisis: 706-542-2200. Connects you to UGA Police- ask to speak to the CAPS on-call clinician.
- Sexual Violence Prevention- 706-542-SAFE

Please note that faculty and staff are obligated to report any knowledge of sexual assault or relationship violence to UGA's Equal Opportunity Office.

Course schedule

You should complete the assigned readings by the day indicated on the schedule. This schedule is subject to change over the course of the semester.

Introduction and Background

Week 1, 08/15 - 08/19: Introduction

Thursday (8/18): Syllabus

Week 2, 08/22 - 08/26: Background

Tuesday (8/23): Nuclear Science and Technology

- WATCH: Matthew Bunn "How Nuclear Bombs Work", **Part 1**(esp. up to 48:23)

Thursday (8/25): Nuclear History and Origins of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

- WATCH: PBS' "The Bomb", streaming through **Kanopy**
- Lawrence Freedman. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy New, Updated and Completely Revised*. 2003, Chapter 1 ("The Arrival of the Bomb")

Proliferation

Week 3, 08/29 - 09/02: Why proliferate?

Tuesday (8/30):

- Scott D Sagan. "Why do states build nuclear weapons?: Three models in search of a bomb". In: *International security* 21.3 (1996), pp. 54–86
- Etel Solingen. "The political economy of nuclear restraint". In: *International Security* 19.2 (1994), pp. 126–169

Thursday (9/1):

- Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs. "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation". In: *International Security* 39.2 (Oct. 2014), pp. 7–51. ISSN: 0162-2889, 1531-4804. DOI: [10.1162/ISEC_a_00177](https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00177)
- Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke. "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation". In: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51.1 (Feb. 2007), pp. 167–194. ISSN: 0022-0027, 1552-8766. DOI: [10.1177/0022002706296158](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706296158)

Week 4, 09/05 - 09/09: Nuclear Restraint

Tuesday (9/6):

- Maria Rost Rublee. *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*. University of Georgia Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-8203-3235-2, **Chapter 2** ("Understanding the International Social Environment")
- Jacques E.C. Hymans. "Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb". In: *International Security* 36.2 (Oct. 2011), pp. 154–189. ISSN: 0162-2889, 1531-4804. DOI: [10.1162/ISEC_a_00059](https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00059)

Thursday (9/8): NO CLASS

Bargaining

Week 5, 09/12 - 09/16: Have Nuclear Weapons Changed the World?

Tuesday (9/13):

- Molly Berkemeier and Matthew Fuhrmann. *Nuclear Weapons in Foreign Policy*. Aug. 2017. DOI: [10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.457](https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.457)
- Thomas C. Schelling. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press, 1966. ISBN: 978-0-300-00221-8, Chapter 1, "The Diplomacy of Violence"

Thursday (9/15):

- Scott Douglas Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons : An Enduring Debate*. 3rd ed. W.W. Norton & Co., 2013. ISBN: 978-0-393-92010-9, pp. 3-17, 46-53

Week 6, 09/19 - 09/23: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Behavior

Tuesday(9/20): Nuclear Deterrence

- Robert Powell. "The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence". In: *Political Science Quarterly* 100.1 (1985), pp. 75–96. ISSN: 0032-3195. DOI: [10.2307/2150861](https://doi.org/10.2307/2150861)
- Vipin Narang. "What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict". In: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57.3 (June 2013), pp. 478–508. ISSN: 0022-0027, 1552-8766. DOI: [10.1177/0022002712448909](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712448909)

Thursday (9/22): Nuclear Coercion, Crises, and Compellence

- Richard K. Betts. *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*. Brookings Institution, 1987. ISBN: 978-0-8157-0936-7, Chapter 4
- Matthew Kroenig. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes". In: *International Organization* 67.1 (Jan. 2013), pp. 141–171. ISSN: 0020-8183, 1531-5088. DOI: [10.1017/S0020818312000367](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000367)

Week 7, 09/26 - 09/30: Activity 1: Nuclear Crisis Simulation

Week 8, 10/03 - 10/07:

Tuesday (9/27): Conventional Conflict and Nuclear Deterrence

- Robert Powell. "Nuclear brinkmanship, limited war, and military power". In: *International Organization* 69.3 (2015), pp. 589–626
- Barry R Posen. *Inadvertent escalation: Conventional war and nuclear risks*. Cornell University Press, 2014, [Chapter 1](#)

Thursday (9/29): Conventional Security and Nuclear Policy

- Vipin Narang. "Strategies of nuclear proliferation: How states pursue the bomb". In: *International Security* 41.3 (2016), pp. 110–150
- Mark S Bell. "Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international politics". In: *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42.1 (2019), pp. 3–28

Week 9, 10/10 - 10/14: Activity 2: Revisiting the Cuban Missile Crisis

Addressing Nuclear Weapons

Week 10, 10/17 - 10/21:

Tuesday (10/25): A Nuclear Taboo?

- Nina Tannenwald. *The nuclear taboo*. Cambridge University Press, 2007, [Chapter 2](#)
- Lauren Sukin. "Experimental evidence on determinants of support for nuclear use in response to threats of nuclear retaliation." In: *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 26.3 (2020), p. 336

Thursday (10/27):Counterproliferation

- Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew Fuhrmann. "Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?" In: *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34.2 (Apr. 2011), pp. 161–187. ISSN: 0140-2390, 1743-937X. DOI: [10.1080/01402390.2011.559021](#)
- Nicholas L. Miller. "The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions". In: *International Organization* 68.4 (2014), pp. 913–944. ISSN: 0020-8183, 1531-5088. DOI: [10.1017/S0020818314000216](#)

Week 11, 10/24 - 10/28:

Tuesday (11/1): Counterproliferation II

- Gene Gerzhoy. "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions". In: *International Security* 39.4 (Apr. 2015), pp. 91–129. ISSN: 0162-2889, 1531-4804. DOI: [10.1162/ISEC_a_00198](#)
- Jon R. Lindsay. "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare". In: *Security Studies* 22.3 (July 2013), pp. 365–404. ISSN: 0963-6412, 1556-1852. DOI: [10.1080/09636412.2013.816122](#)

Thursday (11/3): Arms Control and Disarmament

- Charles Glaser. "The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament". In: *Survival* 40.1 (Jan. 1998), pp. 112–128. ISSN: 0039-6338, 1468-2699. DOI: [10.1080/00396338.1998.9688523](#)
- Thomas Schelling. "A World without Nuclear Weapons?" In: (2009), p. 7, [Link](#)
- Rebecca Davis Gibbons. "The Humanitarian Turn in Nuclear Disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons". In: *The Nonproliferation Review* 25.1-2 (Jan. 2018), pp. 11–36. ISSN: 1073-6700, 1746-1766. DOI: [10.1080/10736700.2018.1486960](#)

Activity 3: NPT Review Conference Simulation

Week 12, 10/31 - 11/04: [Part I](#)

Week 13, 11/07 - 11/11: [Part II](#)

Week 14, 11/14 - 11/18: [Part III](#)

Week 15, 11/21 - 11/25: [Debriefing](#)

Conclusion

Week 16, 11/28 - 12/02: Emerging Issues

Tuesday (11/29):

- Linton F. Brooks. "The End of Arms Control?" In: *Daedalus* 149.2 (Apr. 2020), pp. 84–100. ISSN: 0011-5266, 1548-6192. DOI: [10.1162/daed_a_01791](https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01791)
- James Timbie. "A Way Forward". In: *Daedalus* 149.2 (Apr. 2020), pp. 190–204. ISSN: 0011-5266, 1548-6192. DOI: [10.1162/daed_a_01797](https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01797)

Thursday (12/1):

- Rupal N. Mehta and Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark. "Unpacking the Iranian Nuclear Deal: Nuclear Latency and U.S. Foreign Policy". In: *The Washington Quarterly* 39.4 (Oct. 2016), pp. 45–61. ISSN: 0163-660X. DOI: [10.1080/0163660X.2016.1261567](https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1261567)
- Johnson & Krabill (2020), [AI, Cyberspace, and Nuclear Weapons](#)