

## **INTL 4300: Comparative Political Institutions**

Spring 2019

Dr. Molly Ariotti

T/R : 9:30-10:45

Location: Zell B. Miller Learning Center, Room 275  
(BLDG 0081, RM 275)

**Office Hours:** By appointment

**Office Location:** 318 Candler Hall (BLDG 0031)

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### **Course Description:**

Why do dictators create legislatures? Are parliamentary systems better than presidential systems? Could a third party win the presidency in the United States? These questions all ask you to think about political institutions, and their role in structuring the political interactions we observe around the world. Political institutions are often thought of as the "rules of the game," and include topics like the nature of executive-legislative relationships, the type of governments that form and how long they last, party systems, electoral rules, and elections. While much of this class focuses on formal institutions and democracies, we will also discuss the role of informal institutions, and the use of institutions by authoritarian regimes. By improving our understanding of the rules of the game, we can improve our understanding of big questions, such as when and why democratization is more successful, why elections look the way they do, and when parties might be incentivized to behave differently.

The course covers all world regions, and we will examine a number of competing hypotheses and the empirical evidence presented in support of them. As a result, the readings will take a number of methodological approaches.

*Course Prerequisites: INTL 3300*

### **Course Objectives:**

1. Develop a deeper understanding of political institutions and their effect on political actors.
2. Examine arguments made by existing scholarship and assess strengths and weaknesses in existing knowledge
3. Think critically about the role of both formal and informal political institutions in structuring behavior and outcomes
4. Think about the role political institutions play in both democratic and authoritarian contexts
5. Learn about the role political institutions play in democratic transitions

## **Course Requirements:**

You are expected to (1) attend all lectures; (2) complete the required reading before the start of each class; (3) complete all assignments. In the event of an emergency, it is expected you will contact me with appropriate documentation within 24 hours of a missed class or assignment deadline.

Your responsibilities will often force you to make choices about what you need to prioritize. If you have a conflict and cannot attend class, I expect you to communicate with me in a timely fashion, preferably in advance of the absence. I will not take attendance every class, however I will collect group work and other in-class assignments that will make up your participation grade. As a result, in order to score high marks on participation, you will need to be in class. Because I expect you to attend all lectures, **I will not post slides or notes online.** You should try to befriend some classmates early on so that you can make a copy of their notes in the event that you are absent. I will not make photocopies of my notes, nor will I hold a special make up class session during my office hours.

If you have any special accommodations, I expect that you will provide me with all necessary paperwork during the first week of class, and set up a time to meet with me to discuss what I expect from you.

## **Participation:**

I have one rule about participation in my classes: Class has to be made better by your presence than it would have been otherwise. If you improve the quality of class in some way, you will write a sentence or two describing what you contributed and why it mattered on a piece of paper that YOU MUST TURN IN to me on your way out of class. You must hand it to me, directly, and I will either accept it, or reject it. To earn full credit for participation in class, you need to have turned these slips in for a majority of class meetings.

## **Assignments:**

I will discuss assignments in class, and after that discussion information about the assignment and deadline may be posted to eLC. If you are absent, I encourage you to speak with a classmate or come to office hours in order to be clear about the expectations.

Each assignment is due **in class** (paper copy in person in class, unless specifically noted otherwise). Late assignments will be accepted, but penalized commensurate with lateness. I reserve discretion to set a deadline after which I will accept no further late work. It is always best to contact me directly (by whichever means you feel most comfortable) to discuss late work, or other reasons why you may have a problem meeting a deadline. I understand that sometimes things get overwhelming, and I want to work with you to find a solution – but you need to take responsibility by talking to me.

If you know there will be a conflict with a deadline, it is best to talk to me before the assignment is due, rather than the day of or after the fact. I am always happy to accept work before a deadline, if you know that you will be absent on the due date.

### **Grading and Scale:**

Class participation: 10%

Homework assignments (6, worth 5%-10% each): 50%

Midterm: 20%

Final: 20%

A (93-100)	C+ (77-79.9)
A- (90-92.9)	C (73-76.9)
B+ (87-89.9)	C- (70-72.9)
B (83-86.9)	D (60-69.9)
B- (80-82.9)	FAIL (0-59.9)

### **Required Course Materials:**

There is no required textbook for this course. Occasionally readings or chapters excerpted from books will be placed on eLC for you to access. Otherwise, readings are available through the library website (in order to access these readings you may either need to be on campus or logged into your UGA library access account). If you have trouble locating a particular scholarly article, you can often find a copy posted on the author's professional website (try searching their name and "political science"), or on [Google Scholar](#). You may also use the university subscription to the *Washington Post* in order to access articles from the Monkey Cage blog which may be assigned as reading or discussed in class.

## SCHEDULE OF CLASSES

Readings should be completed *prior to class* on the day they are listed. Assignments are listed on the day I will discuss them in class, and the due date is clearly listed along with the instructions below.

*The course syllabus is a general plan for the course; deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary. While I might adjust the timing for topics if we are unable to cover them as planned, I will **not** move the exam dates.*

### **Week 1: January 9-11**

#### **Introduction**

*Thursday:* Course overview, introductions  
Challenges of measuring democracy

*No required reading*

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. Ch. 2, p. 9-30 (Skim -- posted on eLC)
2. Bevir, Mark. 2010. [“The Odd Couple: Coalition government in Britain.”](#)  
(Skim this, updates parts of p. 11 in Lijphart that are a bit out of date!)
3. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. Ch. 3, p. (posted on eLC)
4. BBC. 2017. [“Why don’t we elect MPs by proportional representation?”](#)
5. NYT. 2017. [“Theresa May Reaches Deal for Backing of Northern Ireland Party.”](#)

**HOMEWORK 1:** Complete the syllabus quiz on eLC. All questions can be answered using the syllabus, which is posted to Week 1 of eLC’s course content modules. You will only have one attempt to take this quiz, so be sure not to start it until you are ready to complete it.

**DUE JANUARY 15 BY START OF CLASS (9:30 AM TUESDAY)**

**\*\* Get a head start on Homework 2 for next week \*\***

**HOMEWORK 2:** Using the DD criteria we discussed in class, code Burkina Faso and France in 2017. Write one sentence for each dimension of their coding rules (4 for each country, 8 sentences total – more than ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ please), explaining why you code it the way you do. Be prepared to discuss these in class on Friday! Please write or print a copy to turn in at the end of Friday’s class.

You must include a list of references with your paper, and clearly document where you found information using in-text citations.

**DUE NEXT THURSDAY IN CLASS (JANUARY 17)**

## **Week 2: January 14-18**

### **Types of Democracy: Parliamentary democracies**

*Tuesday:* Introduction to three types of democracy (overview) – Parliamentary democracies

*Required reading:*

1. Clark, Golder, Golder. 2017. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. p.454-457 (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Stepan and Skach. 1993. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism." *World Politics*. 46:1, p. 1-22.
2. Linz. 1990. "The Virtues of Parliamentarism." *Journal of Democracy*. 1:4, p. 84-91.

**HOMEWORK 2 REMINDER:** Using the DD criteria we discussed in class, code Burkina Faso and France in 2017. Write one sentence for each dimension of their coding rules (4 for each country, 8 sentences total – more than 'yes' or 'no,' please), explaining why you code it the way you do. Be prepared to discuss these in class on Friday! Please write or print a copy to turn in at the end of Friday's class.

You must include a list of references with your paper, and clearly document where you found information using in-text citations.

### **DUE THURSDAY IN CLASS (JANUARY 17)**

*Thursday:* Delegation and parliamentary democracy

*Required reading:*

1. Strom, Müller, Bergman. 2003. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Ch. 1, p. 2-32 (posted on eLC)
2. Huber and Lupia. 2001. "Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45:1, p. 18-32.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Gerring, Thacker, Moreno. 2009. "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?" *Comparative Political Studies*. 42:3, p.327-359.

### **BRING HOMEWORK 2 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

## **Week 3: January 21-25**

### **Types con'd: Semi-presidential democracies**

*Tuesday:* Semi-presidential democracies

*Required reading:*

1. Duverger. 1980. "A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government." *European Journal of Political Research*. 8, p. 165-187. (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones. 2010. "Who's in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets." *Comparative Political Studies*. 43:11, p. 1415-1441.
2. Elgie and Moestrup, eds. 2007. *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*. Routledge Press.

Thursday:

*Required reading:*

1. Elgie. 2008. "The Perils of Semi-presidentialism. Are They Exaggerated?" *Democratisation*. 15:1, p. 49-66.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Cheibub and Chernykh. 2009. "Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?" *Constitutional Political Economy*. 20:3, p. 202-229.

#### **Week 4: January 28-February 1**

#### **Types con'd: Presidential democracies**

Tuesday:

*Required reading:*

1. Linz. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Mainwaring. 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies*. 26:2, p. 198-228.
2. Van de walle. 2003. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems." *Journal of Modern African Studies*.

**HOMEWORK 3:** Consider our discussions about parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential democracies from class and the readings. Is there one that you think is *always* the best choice? Why? Are there certain circumstances where one arrangement might be preferable to another? What characteristics would you see as making one type or another better or worse for a country? Write one page (double-spaced) explaining the strengths and weaknesses of each type of democracy, and under what circumstances you think it is the best choice.

You must include a list of references with your paper, and clearly document where you found information using in-text citations.

**DUE FEBRUARY 5 (TUESDAY)**

Thursday:

*Required reading:*

1. Chaisty, Cheeseman, Power. 2012. "Rethinking the 'presidentialism debate': conceptualizing coalitional politics in regional perspective." *Democratization*, p. 1-23.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Martinez. 2017. "Presidential survival in South America: Rethinking the role of democracy." *International Political Science Review*. 38:1, p. 40-55.

**Week 5: February 4-8**  
**Executive-Legislative Relations: Making Governments**

*Tuesday:* Who gets to be in the government?

*Required reading:*

1. Cheibub, Przeworski, Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science*. 34, p. 565-587.
2. Golder, Golder, Siegel. 2012. "Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Parliamentary Government Formation." *The Journal of Politics*. 74:2, p. 427-445.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Amorim-Neto. 2006. "The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas." *Comparative Political Studies*. 39:4, p. 415-440.
2. Martin and Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45:1, p. 33-50.
3. Golder. 2010. "Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process." *Comparative Political Studies*. 43:1, p. 3-32.

**BRING HOMEWORK 3 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

*Thursday:* How are ministerial portfolios shared?

*Required reading:*

1. Ariotti and Golder. 2018. "Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies*.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Gamson. 1961. "A Theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review*. 26, p. 373-382.
2. Warwick and Druckman. 2006. "The Portfolio Allocation Paradox: An Investigation into the Nature of a Very Strong but Puzzling Relationship." *European Journal of Political Research*. 45, p. 635-665.
3. Bassi. 2013. "A Model of Endogenous Government Formation." *American Journal of Political Science*. 57:4, p. 777-793.
4. Golder and Thomas. 2014. "Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44, p. 29-39.

**HOMEWORK 4:** Find an article in the news that discusses the formation of a coalition government. Write a one page (double-spaced) summary describing: 1) Whether the country is presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary; 2) Which parties are involved in the government; 3) Details about the negotiation process that led to the formation of the coalition government; 4) When the last elections were held prior to the formation of this government. Note: The best assignments will likely require you to use more than one article to gather all of this information and discuss it adequately. If you speak another language that is of use, feel free to use resources in that language (i.e. French, Spanish, Chinese, Wolof, Arabic, etc.) to help you in your research.

You must include a list of references with your paper, and clearly document where you found information using in-text citations.

**DUE FEBRUARY 14 (THURSDAY)**

**Week 6: February 11-15**  
**Executive-Legislative Relations: Breaking Governments**

Tuesday:

*Required reading:*

1. Cheibub and Limongi. 2002. "Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 5, p. 151-179.

Thursday: "Strategy"

*Required reading:*

1. Mershon. 1996. "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments." *American Political Science Review*. 90:3, p. 534-554.
2. Huber. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review*. 90:2, p. 269-282.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Warwick. 1992. "Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western European Parliamentary Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies*. 25:3, p. 332-361.
2. Bergman, Ersson, Hellström. 2015. "Government formation and breakdown in Western and Central Eastern Europe." *Comparative European Politics*. 13:3, p. 345-375.
3. Druckman and Thies. 2002. "The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration." *American Journal of Political Science*. 46:4, p. 760-771.

**BRING HOMEWORK 4 TO CLASS**

**Week 7: February 18-22**  
**Elections and Electoral Integrity**

Tuesday: Assessing election quality

*Required reading:*

1. Norris, Frank, Martinez i Coma. "Assessing the Quality of Elections." *Journal of Democracy*. 24:4, p. 124-135.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Matthews. 2016. "[North Carolina "can no longer be classified as a full democracy"](#)." Vox. [Also follow link to Andrew Gelman's blog at the end for a debate about the validity of the EIP claims]

Thursday: Observing elections

*Required reading:*

1. Hyde and Marinov. 2014. "Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation." *International Organization*. 68, p. 329-359.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Ichino and Schündeln. 2012. "Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana." *Journal of Politics*. 74:1, p. 292-307.

- Hyde. 2011. "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55:2, p. 356-369.

### **Week 8: February 25-March 1**

#### **Electoral Systems**

*Tuesday*: Majoritarian electoral systems (SMDP, SNTV, AV, TRS)

*Required reading*:

- Clark, Golder, Golder. 2017. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. p. 534-548 (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading*:

- Carey and Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies*. 14:4, p. 417-439.

\*REVIEW SESSION at the end of class\*

**Note**: No homework will be due this week. If you have questions on the material covered up until this week, be sure to bring them – when everyone is out of questions, class will end!

*Thursday*: MIDTERM EXAM (in class)

### **Week 9: March 4-8**

#### **Electoral Systems (Con'd) and Their Consequences**

*Tuesday*: Proportional (and mixed) electoral systems (Closed/Open list PR, STV)

*Required reading*:

- Clark, Golder, Golder. 2017. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. p. 549-569 (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading*:

- Golder. 2005. "Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2000." *Electoral Studies*. 24, p. 103-121.

*Thursday*: Types of representation

*Required reading*:

- Krook and O'Brien. 2010. "The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide." *Comparative Politics*. 42:3, 253-272.

*Further [optional] reading*:

- O'Brien and Rickne. 2016. "Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership." *American Political Science Review*. 110:1, p.112-126.
- Caul Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer. 2010. "Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions." *The Journal of Politics*. 72:4, p.990-1002.

### **Week 10: March 11-15**

#### **SPRING BREAK**

**Week 11: March 18-22**  
**Parties and Party Systems**

*Tuesday:* Duverger's Theory

*Required reading:*

1. Clark and Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Law"

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Amorim Neto and Cox. 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41:1, p. 149-174.
2. Duverger. 1963 [1954]. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

*Thursday:* Party systems outside of Western Europe

*Required reading:*

1. Lindberg. 2007. "Institutionalization of Party systems? Stability and Fluidity Among Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies." *Government and Opposition*. 42:2, p. 215-241.
2. Mainwaring and Torcal. 2006. "Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization." *Handbook of Party Politics*. p. 204-227. (eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Mainwaring and Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
2. Tavits. 2005. "The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." 49:2, p. 283-298.
3. Moser. 1999. "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States." *World Politics*. 51, p.359-84.
4. Kuenzi and Lambright. 2001. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries." *Party Politics*. 7:4, p.437-468.

**Week 12: March 25-29**  
**More Parties**

*Tuesday:* Dominant parties

*Required reading:*

1. van de Walle. 2003. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 41:2, p.297-321.

*Thursday:* Ethnic parties

*Required reading:*

1. Chandra. 2005. "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability." *Perspectives on Politics*. 3:2, p. 235-252.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Posner. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review*. 98, p. 529-545.
2. Basedau and Stroh. 2012. "How Ethnic are African parties really? Evidence from four Francophone countries." *International Political Science Review*. 33:1, p. 5-24.

**Week 13: April 1-5**  
**Legislatures**

*Tuesday:*

*Required reading:*

1. Fish. 2006. "Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies." *Journal of Democracy*. 17:1, p. 5-20.
2. Barkan. 2008. "Legislatures on the Rise?" *Journal of Democracy*. 19:2, p. 124-137.

**HOMEWORK 5:** Think about everything we've covered regarding electoral systems and the incentives they create, party systems, and executive-legislative relations (etc.). What do you see as essential to the creation of an effective legislature? What do you think promotes good legislative practice, both with regards to accountability to constituents and with respect to relations with the executive? If you were tasked with improving the capacity of a legislature in a developing democracy, what sorts of recommendations would you make? Be sure to consider trade-offs that come from combining different types of institutions.

You must include a list of references with your paper, and clearly document where you found information using in-text citations.

**DUE APRIL 9 (TUESDAY)**

*Thursday:* NO CLASS (CONFERENCE)

**Week 14: April 8-12**  
**Informal Institutions**

*Tuesday:* Overview of informal institutions

*Required reading:*

1. Helmke and Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda." *Perspectives on Politics*. 2:4, p. 725-740.

**BRING HOMEWORK 5 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

*Thursday :* Examples of information institutions

*Required reading:*

1. Woods. 1992. "Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power through a Public Sphere." *African Studies Review*. 35:2, p. 77-100.
2. Mueller. 2018. "Personal Politics Without Clientelism? Interpreting Citizen-Politician Contact in Africa." *African Studies Review*. 61:2, p. 28-54.

**Week 15: April 15-18**  
**Institutions in Autocracies**

*Tuesday:* Why build institutions in an autocracy?

*Required reading:*

1. Kendall-Taylor and Frantz. 2014. "Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies." *The Washington Quarterly*. 37:4, p. 71-84.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Gandhi and Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies*. 40:11, p. 1279-1301.

**HOMEWORK 6:** Use the Polity dataset to identify a country that is coded as a dictatorship (-6 to -10) or an "anocracy"/ "mixed regime" (-5 to 5). Research the tactics used by that country's leaders in the past five years to consolidate power through authoritarian institutions. Discuss the creation and reinforcement of authoritarian institutions in your country. Next, imagine you work for an NGO or government institution with an interest in promoting democracy: What sorts of challenges do you see in dismantling these types of institutions? Can they be co-opted into transitional democratic institutions? What proposals would you have for improving democratic institutions in your country?

You must include a list of references with your paper, and clearly document where you found information using in-text citations.

**DUE APRIL 23 (TUESDAY)**

*Thursday:* Authoritarian Institutions

*Required reading:*

1. Donno. 2013. "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*. 57:3, p. 703-716.
2. Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth. 6 June 2014. ["What good is a fake legislature?"](#) *The Monkey Cage Blog (The Washington Post)*.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Simpser. 2013. ["Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections."](#) Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 1 is available for free online!]
2. Knutsen, Nygard, and Wig. "Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?" *World Politics*. 69:1, p.98-143.
3. Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth. 2013. "Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44, p.655-684.
4. Wilson and Wright. 2015. "Authoritarian Legislatures and Expropriation Risk." *British Journal of Political Science*. 47, p.1-17.

**Week 16: April 22-26**  
**Wrap-up and Review**

*Tuesday:* Institutions and regime type

*No required reading, in-class discussion:*

Come to class prepared to discuss institutions in democracies and autocracies. **Bring your own questions**, and think about how you might answer the following questions:

1. What are some similarities between how institutions function in democracies and autocracies?
2. Can you see a pathway for authoritarian institutions to become more democratic? How do you see that transitional process potentially playing out? [Feel free to use a country example and explain how that informs your explanation.]
3. What long-term effects might the legacy of authoritarianism have for political institutions in a post-transitional context? What can a newly democratizing country do to mitigate the potential threat of a backslide towards authoritarianism?

**BRING HOMEWORK 6 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

*Thursday:* Review session for the final exam

**FINAL EXAM: MAY 7, 8-11 AM (Room TBD)**

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**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

**University Honor Code and Academic Honesty Policy**

As a University of Georgia student, you have agreed to abide by the University's academic honesty policy, "A Culture of Honesty," and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards described in "A Culture of Honesty" found at: <https://ovpi.uga.edu/academic-honesty/academic-honesty-policy>. Lack of knowledge of the academic honesty policy is not a reasonable explanation for a violation. Questions related to course assignments and the academic honesty policy should be directed to the instructor.