

## **INTL 4300: Comparative Political Institutions**

Fall 2018

Dr. Molly Ariotti

M W F : 1:25-2:15 pm

Location: Zell B. Miller Learning Center, Room 147

(BLDG 0081, RM 0147)

**Office Hours:** Wednesdays, 2:30-4:30 pm (or by appointment)

**Office Location:** 318 Candler Hall (BLDG 0031)

**Email:** mariotti@uga.edu

### **Course Description:**

The goal of this course is to further your understanding of political institutions in the comparative context. Political institutions are often thought of as the « rules of the game, » and they influence the strategic choices that political actors make. We will cover a variety of topics including both formal and informal institutions, as well as examining the role institutions play in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. We will examine a number of competing hypotheses and the empirical evidence presented in support of them. As a result, the readings will take a number of methodological approaches.  
*Course Prerequisites: INTL 3300 or INTL 3200 or INTL 3200E*

### **Course Objectives:**

1. Develop a deeper understanding of political institutions and their effect on political actors.
2. Examine arguments made by existing scholarship and assess strengths and weaknesses in existing knowledge
3. Think critically about the role of both formal and informal political institutions in structuring behavior and outcomes
4. Think about the role political institutions play in both democratic and authoritarian contexts
5. Learn about the role political institutions play in democratic transitions

### **Course Requirements:**

Students are expected to (1) attend all lectures; (2) complete the required reading before the start of each class; (3) complete all assignments. In the event of an emergency, it is expected the student will contact me with appropriate documentation within 24 hours of a missed class or assignment deadline.

Your responsibilities will often force you to make choices about what you need to prioritize. If you have a conflict and cannot attend class, I expect you to communicate with me in a timely fashion, preferably in advance of the absence. I will not take attendance every class, however I will collect group work and other in-class assignments that will make up your participation grade. As a result, in order to score high marks on participation, you will need to be in class. Because I expect you to attend all lectures, **I will not post slides or notes online.** You should try to befriend some classmates early on so that you can make a

copy of their notes in the event that you are absent. I will not make photocopies of my notes, nor will I hold a special make up class session during my office hours.

If you have any special accommodations, I expect that you will provide me with all necessary paperwork during the first week of class, and set up a time to meet with me to discuss what I expect from you.

**Assignments:**

I will discuss assignments in class, and after that discussion information about the assignment and deadline may be posted to eLC. If you are absent, I encourage you to speak with a classmate or come to office hours in order to be clear about the expectations.

Each assignment is due **in class** (paper copy in person in class, unless specifically noted otherwise). Late assignments will accrue a penalty of one letter grade (e.g. a B+ becomes a C+) each 24-hour period until the assignment is given to the instructor. I reserve discretion to set a deadline after which I will accept no further late work. It is always best to contact me directly (by whichever means you feel most comfortable) to discuss late work, or other reasons why you may have a problem meeting a deadline. If you know there is a conflict, it is also best to talk to me before the assignment is due, rather than the day of or after the fact.

**Grading and Scale:**

Class participation: 10%  
Homework assignments (10, worth 5% each): 50%  
Midterm: 20%  
Final: 20%

A (93-100)	C+ (77-79.9)
A- (90-92.9)	C (73-76.9)
B+ (87-89.9)	C- (70-72.9)
B (83-86.9)	D (60-69.9)
B- (80-82.9)	FAIL (0-59.9)

**Required Course Materials:**

There is no required textbook for this course. Occasionally readings or chapters excerpted from books will be placed on eLC for you to access. Otherwise, readings are available through the library website (in order to access these readings you may either need to be on campus or logged into your UGA library access account). If you have trouble locating a particular scholarly article, you can often find a copy posted on the author's professional website (try searching their name and "political science"), or on [Google Scholar](#). You may also use the university subscription to the *Washington Post* in order to access articles from the Monkey Cage blog which may be assigned as reading or discussed in class.

## SCHEDULE OF CLASSES

Readings should be completed *prior to class* on the day they are listed. Assignments are listed on the day I will discuss them in class, and the due date is clearly listed along with the instructions below.

*The course syllabus is a general plan for the course; deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary. While I might adjust the timing for topics if we are unable to cover them as planned, I will **not** move the exam dates.*

### **Week 1: August 13-17**

#### **Introduction**

*Monday:* Course overview, introductions

*Wednesday:* Challenges of measuring democracy

*Required reading:*

1. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. Ch. 2, p. 9-30 (posted on eLC)
2. Bevir, Mark. 2010. "[The Odd Couple: Coalition government in Britain.](#)" (Skim this, updates parts of p. 11 in Lijphart that are a bit out of date!)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. BBC. 2017. "[Why don't we elect MPs by proportional representation?](#)"
2. NYT. 2017. "[Theresa May Reaches Deal for Backing of Northern Ireland Party.](#)"

*Friday:* Majoritarian democracies and consensus democracies

*Required reading:*

1. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. Ch. 3, p. (posted on eLC)

Bring at least one question from your readings on consensus and majoritarian democracies, and be prepared to participate in class discussion!

**BRING HOMEWORK 1 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

### **Week 2: August 20-24**

#### **Types of Democracy: Parliamentary democracies**

*Monday:* Introduction to three types of democracy (overview)

*Required reading:*

1. Clark, Golder, Golder. 2017. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. p.454-457 (posted on eLC)

*Wednesday:* Parliamentary democracies

*Required reading:*

1. Strom, Müller, Bergman. 2003. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Ch. 1, p. 2-32 (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Stepan and Skach. 1993. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism." *World Politics*. 46:1, p. 1-22.
2. Linz. 1990. "The Virtues of Parliamentarism." *Journal of Democracy*. 1:4, p. 84-91.

*Friday:* Delegation in parliamentary democracy: potential problems?

*Required reading:*

1. Huber and Lupia. 2001. "Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45:1, p. 18-32.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Gerring, Thacker, Moreno. 2009. "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?" *Comparative Political Studies*. 42:3, p.327-359.

**BRING HOMEWORK 2 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

**Week 3: August 27-31**

**Types con'd: Semi-presidential democracies**

*Monday:* Semi-presidential democracies

*Required reading:*

1. Duverger. 1980. "A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government." *European Journal of Political Research*. 8, p. 165-187. (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones. 2010. "Who's in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets." *Comparative Political Studies*. 43:11, p. 1415-1441.
2. Elgie and Moestrup, eds. 2007. *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*. Routledge Press.

*Wednesday:* Problems with semi-presidentialism?

*Required reading:*

1. Elgie. 2008. "The Perils of Semi-presidentialism. Are They Exaggerated?" *Democratisation*. 15:1, p. 49-66.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Cheibub and Chernykh. 2009. "Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?" *Constitutional Political Economy*. 20:3, p. 202-229.

*Friday:* NO CLASS (CONFERENCE)

**Week 4: September 3-7**

**Types con'd: Presidential democracies**

*Monday:* NO CLASSES (LABOR DAY)

*Wednesday:*

*Required reading:*

1. Linz. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Mainwaring. 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies*. 26:2, p. 198-228.
2. Van de walle. 2003. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems." *Journal of Modern African Studies*.

*Friday:*

*Required reading:*

1. Chaisty, Cheeseman, Power. 2012. "Rethinking the 'presidentialism debate': conceptualizing coalitional politics in regional perspective." *Democratization*, p. 1-23.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Martinez. 2017. "Presidential survival in South America: Rethinking the role of democracy." *International Political Science Review*. 38:1, p. 40-55.

### **BRING HOMEWORK 3 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

#### **Week 5: September 10-14**

#### **Executive-Legislative Relations: Making Governments**

*Monday:* Do coalitions form everywhere?

*Required reading:*

1. Cheibub, Przeworski, Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science*. 34, p. 565-587.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Amorim-Neto. 2006. "The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas." *Comparative Political Studies*. 39:4, p. 415-440.

*Wednesday:* Who gets to be in the government?

*Required reading:*

1. Golder, Golder, Siegel. 2012. "Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Parliamentary Government Formation." *The Journal of Politics*. 74:2, p. 427-445.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Martin and Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45:1, p. 33-50.
2. Golder. 2010. "Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process." *Comparative Political Studies*. 43:1, p. 3-32.

Friday: How are ministerial portfolios shared?

*Required reading:*

1. Ariotti and Golder. 2018. "Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies*.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Gamson. 1961. "A Theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review*. 26, p. 373-382.
2. Warwick and Druckman. 2006. "The Portfolio Allocation Paradox: An Investigation into the Nature of a Very Strong but Puzzling Relationship." *European Journal of Political Research*. 45, p. 635-665.
3. Bassi. 2013. "A Model of Endogenous Government Formation." *American Journal of Political Science*. 57:4, p. 777-793.
4. Golder and Thomas. 2014. "Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44, p. 29-39.

**BRING HOMEWORK 4 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

### **Week 6: September 17-21**

#### **Executive-Legislative Relations: Breaking Governments**

Monday:

*Required reading:*

1. Cheibub and Limongi. 2002. "Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 5, p. 151-179.

Wednesday: Strategic use of the vote of no confidence

*Required reading:*

1. Huber. 1996. "The Vote of No Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review*. 90:2, p. 269-282.

Friday:

*Required reading:*

1. Mershon. 1996. "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments." *American Political Science Review*. 90:3, p. 534-554.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Warwick. 1992. "Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western European Parliamentary Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies*. 25:3, p. 332-361.
2. Bergman, Ersson, Hellström. 2015. "Government formation and breakdown in Western and Central Eastern Europe." *Comparative European Politics*. 13:3, p. 345-375.
3. Druckman and Thies. 2002. "The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration." *American Journal of Political Science*. 46:4, p. 760-771.

**Week 7: September 24-28**  
**Elections and Electoral Integrity**

*Monday:* Assessing election quality

*Required reading:*

1. Norris, Frank, Martinez i Coma. "Assessing the Quality of Elections." *Journal of Democracy*. 24:4, p. 124-135.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Matthews. 2016. "[North Carolina "can no longer be classified as a full democracy"](#)." Vox. [Also follow link to Andrew Gelman's blog at the end for a debate about the validity of the EIP claims]

*Wednesday:* Observing elections

*Required reading:*

1. Hyde and Marinov. 2014. "Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation." *International Organization*. 68, p. 329-359.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Ichino and Schündeln. 2012. "Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana." *Journal of Politics*. 74:1, p. 292-307.
2. Hyde. 2011. "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55:2, p. 356-369.

*Friday:* Discussion

We will have an in-class discussion about elections and what they can/cannot tell us about a country's politics. Bring your questions from this week's readings and lectures – I will call on you at random to contribute your discussion questions and respond to those of your classmates!

Use your country research from the homework due today (Homework 5) to inform your responses to discussion questions.

**BRING HOMEWORK 5 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

**Week 8: October 1-5**  
**Electoral Systems**

*Monday:* Majoritarian electoral systems (SMDP, SNTV, AV, TRS)

*Required reading:*

1. Clark, Golder, Golder. 2017. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. p. 534-548 (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Carey and Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies*. 14:4, p. 417-439.

*Wednesday:* REVIEW SESSION

**Note:** No homework will be due this week. If you have questions on the material covered up until this week, be sure to bring them!

Friday: MIDTERM EXAM (in class)

### **Week 9: October 8-12**

#### **Electoral Systems (Con'd) and Their Consequences**

Monday: Proportional (and mixed) electoral systems (Closed/Open list PR, STV)

*Required reading:*

1. Clark, Golder, Golder. 2017. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. p. 549-569 (posted on eLC)

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Golder. 2005. "Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2000." *Electoral Studies*. 24, p. 103-121.

Wednesday: Women's representation

*Required reading:*

1. Caul Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer. 2010. "Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions." *The Journal of Politics*. 72:4, p.990-1002.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. O'Brien and Rickne. 2016. "Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership." *American Political Science Review*. 110:1, p.112-126.
2. Krook and O'Brien. 2010. "The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide." *Comparative Politics*. 42:3, 253-272.

Friday: Corruption

*Required reading:*

1. Chang and Golden. 2006. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science*. 37, p. 115-137.

#### **BRING HOMEWORK 6 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

### **Week 10: October 15-19**

#### **Parties and Party Systems**

Monday: Duverger's Theory

*Required reading:*

1. Clark and Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Law"

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Amorim Neto and Cox. 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41:1, p. 149-174.
2. Duverger. 1963 [1954]. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wednesday: Post-communist party systems in Eastern Europe

*Required reading:*

1. Tavits. 2005. "The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." 49:2, p. 283-298.



*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Moser. 1999. "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States." *World Politics*. 51, p.359-84.

*Friday:* Evolution of African party systems

*Required reading:*

1. Lindberg. 2007. "Institutionalization of Party systems? Stability and Fluidity Among Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies." *Government and Opposition*. 42:2, p. 215-241.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Mainwaring and Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
2. Kuenzi and Lambright. 2001. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries." *Party Politics*. 7:4, p.437-468.

## **BRING HOMEWORK 7 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

### **Week 11: October 22-26**

#### **More Parties**

*Monday:* Dominant parties

*Required reading:*

1. van de Walle. 2003. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 41:2, p.297-321.

*Wednesday:* Ethnic parties

*Required reading:*

1. Chandra. 2005. "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability." *Perspectives on Politics*. 3:2, p. 235-252.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Posner. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review*. 98, p. 529-545.
2. Basedau and Stroh. 2012. "How Ethic are African parties really? Evidence from four Francophone countries." *International Political Science Review*. 33:1, p. 5-24.

*Friday:* NO CLASSES (FALL BREAK)

### **Week 12: October 29 – November 2**

#### **Legislatures**

*Monday:*

*Required reading:*

1. Fish. 2006. "Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies." *Journal of Democracy*. 17:1, p. 5-20.

*Wednesday:* Can legislatures in developing democracies be effective?

*Required reading:*

1. Barkan. 2008. "Legislatures on the Rise?" *Journal of Democracy*. 19:2, p. 124-137.

Friday:

*Required reading:*

1. Hinojosa and Piscopo. 1 July 2018. [“Women won big in Mexico’s elections – taking nearly half the seats.”](#) *The Monkey Cage Blog (The Washington Post)*.

**BRING HOMEWORK 8 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

### **Week 13: November 5-9**

#### **Informal Institutions**

Monday: Overview of informal institutions

*Required reading:*

1. Helmke and Levitsky. 2004. “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda.” *Perspectives on Politics*. 2:4, p. 725-740.

Wednesday : Civil society

*Required reading:*

1. Woods. 1992. “Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power through a Public Sphere.” *African Studies Review*. 35:2, p. 77-100.

Friday: Clientelism and personal politics

*Required reading:*

1. Mueller. 2018. “Personal Politics Without Clientelism? Interpreting Citizen-Politician Contact in Africa.” *African Studies Review*. 61:2, p. 28-54.

**BRING HOMEWORK 9 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

### **Week 14 : November 12-16**

#### **Institutions in Autocracies**

Monday: Why build institutions in an autocracy?

*Required reading:*

1. Kendall-Taylor and Frantz. 2014. “Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies.” *The Washington Quarterly*. 37:4, p. 71-84.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Gandhi and Przeworski. 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 40:11, p. 1279-1301.

Wednesday: Elections in authoritarian regimes

*Required reading:*

1. Donno. 2013. “Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 57:3, p. 703-716.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Simpson. 2013. [Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections](#). Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 1 is available for free online!]

2. Knutsen, Nygard, and Wig. "Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?" *World Politics*. 69:1, p.98-143.

*Friday:* Legislatures in authoritarian regimes

*Required reading:*

1. Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth. 6 June 2014. "[What good is a fake legislature?](#)" *The Monkey Cage Blog (The Washington Post)*.

*Further [optional] reading:*

1. Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth. 2013. "Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44, p.655-684.
2. Wilson and Wright. 2015. "Authoritarian Legislatures and Expropriation Risk." *British Journal of Political Science*. 47, p.1-17.

**BRING HOMEWORK 10 TO CLASS TO TURN IN**

**Week 15: November 19-23**

**BREAK**

**Week 16: November 26-30**

**Wrap-up and Review**

*Monday:* Institutions and regime type

*No required reading, in-class discussion:*

Come to class prepared to discuss institutions in democracies and autocracies. **Bring your own questions**, and think about how you might answer the following questions:

1. What are some similarities between how institutions function in democracies and autocracies?
2. Can you see a pathway for authoritarian institutions to become more democratic? How do you see that transitional process potentially playing out? [Feel free to use a country example and explain how that informs your explanation.]
3. What long-term effects might the legacy of authoritarianism have for political institutions in a post-transitional context? What can a newly democratizing country do to mitigate the potential threat of a backslide towards authoritarianism?

*Wednesday:* In-class review for final exam

*Friday:* **NO CLASS (CONFERENCE)**

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

**University Honor Code and Academic Honesty Policy**

As a University of Georgia student, you have agreed to abide by the University's academic honesty policy, "A Culture of Honesty," and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards

described in “A Culture of Honesty” found at: <https://ovpi.uga.edu/academic-honesty/academic-honesty-policy>. Lack of knowledge of the academic honesty policy is not a reasonable explanation for a violation. Questions related to course assignments and the academic honesty policy should be directed to the instructor.