

INTL 8210	International Organizations	Spring 2018
Thursday 3:30-6:15	Candler 117	Pre/Corequisites: None
Danny Hill	Dept. of International Affairs	dwhill@uga.edu
Office Hrs: T 2:30-4:30 p.m.	Office: Candler 319	

Course Description

This is a graduate course that deals with the role of international institutions, broadly defined, in overcoming obstacles to international cooperation. We will focus on formal institutions with an emphasis on their capacity to facilitate international cooperation. The purpose of this course is not to trace the development of particular international organizations. Rather, the goal is to understand the role of international institutions in facilitating cooperation among governments across a broad range of policy areas. We will begin with an overview of why governments have an interest in cooperation, what institutions are, and how international institutions/law operate. The second part of the course will address cooperation in specific policy areas. Topics covered include international trade, monetary policy, environmental regimes, military alliances, the laws of war/humanitarian law, conflict intervention, and international human rights law.

Grades/Assignments

Grades are based upon class discussion, three response papers, and a research design paper. Your final grade will be determined as follows:

Class Discussion: 20%

Response Papers (3): 30%

Final Paper: 50%

Class Discussion

Students are expected to read the assigned material and be ready to discuss it in class. Consider the following questions when reading:

- What research question is the author trying to answer?
- What is the author's argument?

- How does the argument fit with the rest of the literature?
- Is the argument logically consistent?
- If the author makes a causal argument, is it plausible?
- Does the evidence support the author's theoretical claims?
- Does the author operationalize concepts appropriately?
- Is the method of analysis appropriate?
- Does the argument have implications that are unexamined?
- Does the study tell us something new and interesting?

Each week everyone will submit, via email, 5-10 discussion questions to me. Discussion questions must be sent one day prior to the meeting. The purpose of the questions is to facilitate discussion, so broad, open-ended questions are encouraged.

Response Papers

Response papers are 6-10 page papers that offer a (constructive) critical evaluation of the week's readings. You may focus on as many or as few readings as you like, but you must offer a well-reasoned critique of the arguments/evidence presented in each piece and *suggestions on how they could be improved*. You must turn in two response papers by the end of the semester,. You may choose which weeks you submit your response essays, but you must submit your first essay by Friday, January 26, and your second by Friday, April 13. Essays must be related to the topic covered the week they are submitted.

Final Paper

For the final paper, students may choose to write either a critical literature review, a research design, or a full research paper.

A critical literature review is not a summary of the readings. Rather, it is a review essay that surveys the literature on a topic and constructs an argument about how different pieces of research on that topic relate to each other. Students who choose this option should write a paper that compares and contrasts different theoretical approaches to the chosen topic, assesses the state of accumulated knowledge on the topic (what we know and what we don't), and identify useful directions for future research. For helpful examples look through any issue of the *Annual Review of Political Science*.

A research design is a plan to conduct an empirical research paper. This entails identifying a research question, developing a theoretical argument that addresses/answers the question,

and proposing a research design to test the argument's implications/hypotheses. Your research design can be qualitative or quantitative, but there must be a plan to execute an empirical research project (it cannot be purely theoretical/conceptual).

A full research paper an entire paper complete with the results of whatever analysis you have conducted. Students may choose this option only if they have a paper that is already underway and that fits with the course subject matter.

Students must submit a one page proposal for their final paper by Friday, February 23. I will provide comments on proposals by March 9, the Friday before Spring Break. Students will distribute revised proposals to the entire class by Monday, March 19. Our meeting on March 22 will be devoted to workshopping your paper proposals - sharing your ideas and offering each other comments and suggestions. Final papers are due on Friday, April 27. Late papers will be penalized one letter grade per day.

Books

We will read selected chapters from the books listed below. I will make electronic copies available on the ELC course website for all but Axelrod.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Franck, Thomas. 1990. *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Vreeland, James. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge University Press.

Guzman, Andrew. 2008. *How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Simmons, Beth. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights*. Cambridge Univeristy Press.

Syllabus Change Policy

The course syllabus is a general plan for the course; deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary.

Students with Disabilities

Students with disabilities who require reasonable accommodations in order to participate in course activities or meet course requirements should contact the instructor or designate during regular office hours or by appointment.

University Honor Code/Academic Honesty Policy

As a University of Georgia student, you have agreed to abide by the University's academic honesty policy, "A Culture of Honesty," and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards described in "A Culture of Honesty" found at: www.uga.edu/honesty. Lack of knowledge of the academic honesty policy is not a reasonable explanation for a violation. Questions related to course assignments and the academic honesty policy should be directed to the instructor.

Reading Schedule

Jan 4: Course Overview

No Reading.

Jan 11: Anarchy, Institutions, and Cooperation

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books. Chaps. 1-4.

Milgrom Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2: 1-23.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chaps. 5-6.

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy." *World Politics* 38: 226-254.

Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19: 5-49.

Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20: 39-51.

Jan 18: Institutional Design

Fearon, James. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52: 269-305.

Lake, David A. 1996. "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations." *International Organization* 50: 1-33.

Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 3-32.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55: 761-799.

Wendt, Alexander. 2001. "Driving With the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design." *International Organization* 55: 1019-1039.

Gilligan, Michael. 2004. "Is There a Broader-Deeper Tradeoff in Multilateral Agreements?" *International Organization* 58: 459-484.

Jan 25: Compliance with International Agreements

Simmons, Beth. 1998. "Compliance With International Agreements." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 75-93.

Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47: 175-205.

Downs, George W., David M. Roake, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50: 379-406.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53: 379-408.

Simmons, Beth. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-835.

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611-622.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *International Organization* 59: 363-398.

Feb 1: International Law/Legalization

Abbott, Kenneth, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization." *International Organization* 54: 401-419.

Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen J. Toope. 2001. "Alternatives to 'Legalization: Richer Views of Law and Politics." *International Organization* 55: 743-758.

Franck, Thomas. 1990. *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*. New York: Oxford University Press. Selected Chapters.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie, David G. Victor, and Yonaton Lupu. 2012. "Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field." *American Journal of International Law* 106: 47-97.

Guzman, Andrew. 2008. *How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 5 (Customary International Law).

Verdier, Pierre-Hugues, and Erik Voeten. 2012. "How Does Customary International Law Change? The Case of State Immunity." Working Paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2106627

Feb 8: International Courts

Staton, Jeffrey K., and Will H. Moore. 2009. "Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics." *International Organization* 65: 553-588.

Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, and Charles Hankla. 2008. "Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice." *American Political Science Review* 102: 435-452.

Voeten, Erik. 2007. "The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights." *International Organization* 61: 669-701.

Helfer, Laurence, and Erik Voeten. 2014. "International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe." *International Organization* 68: 77-110.

Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime." *International Organization* 60: 935-967.

Simmons, Beth, and Allison Danner. 2010. "Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court." *International Organization* 64: 225-256.

Chapman, Terrence L., and Stephen Chaudoin. 2013. "Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court." *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 400-409.

Feb 15: Trade Institutions

Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation." *American Economic Review* 89: 190-214.

Rose, Andrew. 2004. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review* 94 (1): 98-114.

Goldstein, Judith, Doug Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61 (1): 37-67.

Busch, Mark L., and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." *Journal of World Trade* 37: 719-735.

Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62: 477-505.

Mansfield, Edward and Helen Milner. 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism." *International Organization* 53 (1): 589-627.

Mansfield, Edward and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements." *International Organization* 57 (4): 829-862.

Feb 22: International Financial/Monetary Institutions

Krueger, Anne O. 1998 "Whither the World Bank and the IMF?" *Journal of Economic Literature* 36: 1983-2020.

Przeworski, Adam, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2000. "The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth." *Journal of Development Economics* 62: 385-421.

Vreeland, James. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge University Press. All Chapters.

Jensen, Nathan. 2004. "Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of International Monetary Funds Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Flows." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 194-210.

Dreher, Axel, and Martin Gassebner. 2012. "Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis." *International Organization* 66: 329-358.

Mar 1: Security Institutions

Voeten, Erik. 2000. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review* 95: 845-858.

Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59: 527-557.

Thompson, Alexander. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60: 1-34.

Morrow, James D. 2000. "Alliances: Why Write them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 63-83.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 427-439.

Hemmer, Christopher and Peter Katzenstein. 2002. "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism." *International Organization* 56 (3): 575-607.

Mar 8: IOs and Conflict Intervention/Prevention

Diehl, Paul F., Daniel Druckman, and James Wall. 1998. "International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 33-55.

Fortna, Virginia. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 269-292.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2011. "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict" *Journal of Politics* 73: 1051-1054.

Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lisa Morje Howard. 2008. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 283-301.

Shannon, Megan, Daniel Morey, and Frederick J. Boehmke. 2010. "The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Disputes Initiation and Duration." *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 1123-1141.

Karreth, Johannes, and Jaroslav Tir. 2013. "International Institutions and Civil War Prevention." *Journal of Politics* 75: 96-109.

Spring Break, Mar 12 –16

Mar 22: Paper Workshop

Revised proposals distributed to entire class by Mar 19

Mar 29: Laws of War/Humanitarian Law

Morrow, James D. "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties." *International Organization* 55: 971-991.

Morrow, James D. 2007. "When do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101: 559-572.

Rudolph, Christopher. 2001. "Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals." *International Organization* 55: 655-691.

Roper, Steven D. and Barria, Lilian A. 2007. "Donor Motivations and Contributions to War Crimes Tribunals." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51: 285-304.

Kim, Hunjoon, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2010. "Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries." *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 939-963.

Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth, and Sarah Croco. 2006. "Covenants Without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War." *World Politics* 58: 339-377.

Downes, Alexander. 2007. "Restraint or Propellant? Democracy and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51: 872-904.

Apr 5

ISA Conference, no class

Apr 12: International Human Rights Law

Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *International Organization* 54 (2): 217-252.

Hathaway, Oona. 2002. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *Yale Law Journal* 111, skim.

Hathaway, Oona. 2007. "Why do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51: 588-621.

Vreeland, James. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter Into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62: 65-101.

Powell, Emilia and Jeffrey Staton. 2009. "Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation." *International Studies Quarterly* 53:149-174.

Lupu, Yonatan. 2013. "Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Treaties." *International Organization* 67: 469-503.

Simmons, Beth. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights*. Cambridge University Press. Chaps 3-4, 7.

Apr 19: International Organizations and Social Norms

Finnemore, Martha. 1993. "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms." *International Organization* 47: 565-597.

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53: 699-732.

Legro, Jeffrey. 1996. "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step."

American Political Science Review 90: 118-137.

Checkel, Jeffrey. 2001. "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change." *International Organization* 55: 553-588.

Bearce, David H. and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence." *International Organization* 61: 703-733.

Gilligan, Michael, and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt. 2009. "Do Norms Reduce Torture?" *Journal of Legal Studies* 38: 445-470.