

INTL 6200	Preseminar in International Relations	Spring 2017
Tuesday 3:30-6:15	Candler 117	Prerequisites/Corequisites: None
Danny Hill	Dept. of International Affairs	dwhill@uga.edu
Office Hrs: W 2-4 p.m. (and by appointment)	Office: Candler 319	

Course Description

The purpose of this course is to introduce students to 1) general theoretical debates and issues in the IR subfield, and 2) contemporary research in international relations. To that end the course will take a broad approach, covering canonical works that address big theoretical issues as well as more recent research that addresses specific questions about international politics. Broad topics examined include IR paradigms (“isms”), international institutions, international conflict, and the role of domestic politics in international relations. The course is focused on scholarly research more than current events or policy formulation, and is designed primarily for Ph.D. students preparing to take comprehensive exams in international relations.

Grades/Assignments

Grades are based upon class discussion, weekly response papers, and two critical literature reviews. Your final grade will be determined as follows:

Class Discussion: 30%

Response Papers: 30%

Critical Literature Reviews (2): 40%

Class Discussion

Students are expected to read the assigned material and be ready to discuss it in class. Each week 1-2 students will be in charge of leading the class discussion. A discussion schedule will be distributed at the end of the first week. Students in charge of the week’s discussion will submit 5-10 questions to the entire class one day prior to the meeting. The purpose of the questions is to facilitate a discussion, so broad, open-ended questions are encouraged. Consider the following questions when reading:

- What research question is the author trying to answer?
- What is the author’s argument?

- How does the argument fit with the rest of the literature?
- Is the argument logically consistent?
- If the author makes a causal argument, is it plausible?
- Does the evidence support the author's theoretical claims?
- Does the author operationalize concepts appropriately?
- Is the method of analysis appropriate?
- Does the argument have implications that are unexamined?
- Does the study tell us something new and interesting?

Weekly Response Papers

Weekly response papers are 3-5 page papers that offer a summary and evaluation of the week's readings. You may focus on as many or as few readings as you like, but you must offer a summary and evaluation of the author's argument and evidence. The questions above will be useful for this purpose. Weekly responses must be submitted every week except the two weeks you choose to submit your critical review essays (see below).

Critical Review Essay

These are 6-10 page, more well-developed versions of your weekly response papers. For critical review essays you must address all of the readings for the week, and you should keep the summarizing to a minimum. Instead of summarizing, a critical review essay should present a well-reasoned critique of the literature on a topic, explain how different pieces of research on a topic relate to each other, and offer *suggestions on how research in this area could be improved*. You must turn in two critical review essays papers by the end of the semester. You may turn in your response essays at the end of any week (except the last), but your first essay must be submitted by February 17th.

Books

We will be reading selections from the following books. I have noted where a copy will be made available on the course website.

Organski, A.F.K. 1968. *World Politics*, 2nd edition. Alfred A. Knopf. (selected chapters available on course website)

Keohane, Robert O. (ed). 1986. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. Columbia University Press.

Wagner, Harrison. 2007. *War and the State*. University of Michigan Press. (full copy available on course website)

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. (full copy available on course website)

Lake, David A. and Robert Powell. 1999. *Strategic Choice in International Relations*. Princeton University Press.

Course Website

Can be accessed through www.elc.uga.edu. You will need to check this site regularly for posted readings.

Syllabus Change Policy

The course syllabus is a general plan for the course; deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary.

Students with Disabilities

Students with disabilities who require reasonable accommodations in order to participate in course activities or meet course requirements should contact the instructor or designate during regular office hours or by appointment.

University Honor Code/Academic Honesty Policy

As a University of Georgia student, you have agreed to abide by the University's academic honesty policy, "A Culture of Honesty," and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards described in "A Culture of Honesty" found at: www.uga.edu/honesty. Lack of knowledge of the academic honesty policy is not a reasonable explanation for a violation. Questions related to course assignments and the academic honesty policy should be directed to the instructor.

Reading Schedule

Overview

The course begins with a discussion of how theories of international politics should be constructed and evaluated. This reflects larger debates in philosophy of science concerning how knowledge claims more generally should be evaluated. We will then examine the “paradigms” or “isms” that dominated the subfield until (roughly) the 1990s, i.e. Realism, Neo-Liberalism, and Constructivism. We will then spend a week reading and discussing work that criticizes and questions the usefulness of these approaches. The second part of the course focuses on international institutions, covering general issues of design and enforcement in addition to theoretical and empirical research that examines particular institutions, including military alliances, the UN Security Council, the Geneva Conventions, the WTO, and the IMF. The third part of the course examines scholarly work on international conflict, paying attention in particular to strategic models of conflict, which have come to dominate research on international war in the last 20 or so years. The following week covers canonical empirical studies of conflict, as well as studies that speak directly to the various theoretical explanations for conflict covered in preceding weeks. The fourth part of the course focuses on the role of domestic politics in international relations. We will spend one week reading authors who make the general case for incorporating domestic politics into explanations of international behavior, and one week on research that addresses the role of domestic politics in conflict behavior specifically. We end the course by examining two under-studies topics: the role of gender in IR, and psychological approaches to decision making and foreign policy.

1 Theoretical and Methodological Foundations

January 10: Introduction and Course Overview

No reading.

January 17: How Should We Study International Politics?

Singer, J. David. 1969. “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence.” In Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*. Princeton University Press.

Dessler, David. 1991. “Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (3): 337-355.

Lapid, Yosef. 1989. “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era.” *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (3): 235-254.

Zinnes, Dina A. 1980. “Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher.” *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (3): 1980.

January 24: Systemic Theories

Singer, J. David. 1961. "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14 (1): 77-92.

Organski, A.F.K. 1968. *World Politics*, 2nd edition. Alfred A. Knopf. chaps 12 and 14.

Herz, John H. 1950. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 2(2): 157-180.

Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics* chaps 2-5.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28 (3): 317-347.

January 31: Problems of Cooperation in International Politics

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. chaps 1-4.

Keohane, *After Hegemony*. chaps 1, 5-6.

Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38 (1): 226-254.

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2 (2): 1-23.

Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52 (2): 269-305.

February 7: International Norms and Constructivism

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." *International Organization* 52 (4): 855-885.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46 (2): 391-425.

Finnemore, Martha. 1993. "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy." *International Organization* 47 (4): 565-597.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52 (4): 887-917.

Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53 (4): 699-732.

February 14: Bridging Subfields – Beyond Anarchy and Isms

Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49.

Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. “The Promise of Institutional Theory.” *International Security* 20 (1): 39-51.

Lake, David A. 2011. “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress.” *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2): 465-480.

Milner, Helen. 1991. “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique.” *Review of International Studies* 17 (1): 67-85.

Wagner, *War and the State*, chaps 1 and 3.

Lake and Powell, *Strategic Choice in International Relations*, chaps 1 and 2.

2 International Institutions

February 21: Institutional Design and Compliance

Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” *International Organization* 54 (3): 421-456.

Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “The Concept of Legalization.” *International Organization* 54 (3): 401-419.

Lake, David A. 1996. “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations.” *International Organization* 50 (1): 1-33.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” *International Organization* 55 (4): 761-799.

Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. “Contracting Around International Uncertainty.” *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 549-565.

Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. “On Compliance.” *International Organization* 47 (2): 175-205.

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?” *International Organization* 50 (3):

379-406.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53 (2): 379-408.

February 28: Theories of Security and Trade Institutions

Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59 (3): 527-557.

Thompson, Alexander. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60 (1): 1-34.

Morrow, James D. 2001. "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties." *International Organization* 55 (4): 971-991.

Morrow, James D. 2000. "Alliances: Why Write them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 63-83.

Rosendorff, Peter B. and Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55 (4): 829-857.

Mansfield, Edward and Helen Milner. 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism." *International Organization* 53 (1): 589-627.

Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation." *American Economic Review* 89 (1): 190-214.

SPRING BREAK, MARCH 6-10

March 14: Empirical Studies of International Institutions

Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." *International Organization* 48 (3): 425-458.

Simmons, Beth. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-835.

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611-622. (skim. See also reply by Simmons and Daniel Hopkins in the same issue.)

Rose, Andrew. 2004. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review* 94 (1): 98-114.

Goldstein, Judith, Doug Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Re-

lations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and WTO on World Trade.” *International Organization* 61 (1): 37-67.

Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime.” *International Organization* 62 (3):477-505.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (3): 427-439.

Morrow, James D. 2007. “When do States Follow the Laws of War?” *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 559-572.

3 International Conflict

March 21: Strategic Theories of Conflict

Schelling, Thomas. 1960. “An Essay on Bargaining.” In *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press.

Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49 (3): 379-414.

Powell, Robert. 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem.” *International Organization* 60 (1): 169-203.

Wagner, *War and the State*, chap 4.

Achen, Christopher H. and Duncan Snidal. 1989. “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies.” *World Politics* 41 (2): 143-169.

Gartzke, Eric. 1999. “War is in the Error Term.” *International Organization* 53 (3): 567-587.

Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” *International Organization* 51 (3): 335-364.

March 28: Empirical Studies of Conflict

Bremer, Stuart. 1992. “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (2): 309-341.

Lemke, Douglas, and Suzanne Werner. 1996. “Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (2): 235-260.

Fearon, James D. 1994. “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (2): 236-269.

Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom, and Wonjae Hwang. 2008. "War, Power, and Bargaining." *Journal of Politics* 70 (4): 1203-1216.

Chiozza, Giacomo, and H.E. Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 604-619.

Vasquez, John, and Paul Senese. 2005. "Assessing the Steps to War" *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (4): 607-633.

Rider, Toby J., and Andrew P. Owsiak. 2015. "Border Settlement, Commitment Problems, and the Causes of Contiguous Rivalry." *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (4): 508-521.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75-90.

4 Domestic Politics and International Relations

April 4: Incorporating Domestic Politics into Theory

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-460.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51 (4): 513-553.

Lake and Powell, *Strategic Choice in International Relations*, chap 4.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1121-1137.

Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88 (3): 577-592.

McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments." *International Organization* 54 (4): 809-824.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *International Organization* 59 (2): 363-398.

April 11: Domestic Politics and International Conflict

Doyle, Michael. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 80 (4): 1151-1169.

Maoz, Zeev and Russett, Bruce. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 624-638.

Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88 (3): 577-592.

Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises." *American Political Science Review* 92 (4): 829-844.

Schultz, Kenneth. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization* 53 (2): 233-266.

Weeks, Jessica. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62 (1): 35-64.

Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92 (2): 377-389.

Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (1): 25-52.

5 Other Important Things to Consider

April 18: Gender and International Relations

Caprioli, Mary. 2001. "Gendered Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (1): 51-68.

Caprioli, Mary and Mark A. Boyer. 2001. "Gender, Violence, and International Crisis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (4): 503-518.

Carpenter, R. Charli. 2003. "'Women and Children First': Gender, Norms, and Humanitarian Evacuation in the Balkans 1991-1995." *International Organization* 57(4): 661-694.

Plümper, Thomas and Eric Neumayer. 2006. "The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy." *International Organization* 60 (3): 723-754.

Koch, Michael T. and Sarah A. Fulton. 2011. "In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies." *Journal of Politics* 73(1): 1-16.

Further reading TBA.

April 25: Psychological Approaches to Decision Making

Simon, Herbert A. 1985. "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology With Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 79 (2): 293-304.

Quattrone, George A. and Amos Tversky. 1988. "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice." *American Political Science Review* 82 (3): 719-736.

Jervis, Robert. 1988. "War and Misperception." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (4): 675-700.

Levy, Jack S. 1997. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 87-112.

Berejikian, Jeffrey D. 2002. "A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2): 165-183.

Boettcher III, William A. 2004. "The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion." *Political Psychology* 25 (3): 331-362.