Can external international actors change the behavior of rebel groups in internal civil wars through non-violent means? World politics has witnessed interactions among non-state actors, with implications for political and societal changes. One of such attempts is the United Nations action plans with non-state armed groups to reduce the use of child soldiers in conflict zones around the world. As a state-centric organization like the United Nations, this engagement is a unique recent phenomenon that begs in-depth analysis. Such humanitarian engagements often occur in conflict zones with actors that difficult to stage reforms. What are the political processes of those engagements? Our examination of political incentives and conflict circumstances lead us to expect that the confluence of rebel incentive to engage externally, government consent, as well as UN capacity affects rebel groups signing onto UN action plans. Our statistical analysis of UN action plans between 2000 and 2015 test our arguments, complemented with four case analyses of the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, the Philippines, and Sudan. Our study has implications for international community’s external engagement operations in internal conflict zones.
Jo, H., Scholar, H., & Yi, J. Reforming Rebels Case of the United Nations Action Plans.
