Space capabilities are critical to the global economy, military power, and daily life. For example, the United States’ Global Positioning System enables everything from withdrawing cash from ATM machines to allowing the US military to engage in long-range precision strikes. Satellites facilitate long-distance communications, tracking and predicting weather patterns, verifying compliance with arms control treaties, detecting nuclear launches, and supplying critical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for militaries to carry out targeting. Yet with the rise of both state and private space actors, the space domain is becoming increasingly crowded and the risk of accidental collisions is increasing. At the same time, several states are pursuing counterspace weapons—raising the risks of creating highly destructive space debris and increasing the odds of accidental escalation and armed conflict in space and on Earth.
Given these risks, many policymakers and analysts are calling for risk reduction and strategic stability measures in outer space. Such measures could reduce the likelihood of inadvertent escalation, limit tensions, and decrease the possibility of destructive violence in the space domain or the creation of debris that may make outer space inaccessible to human activities. While no singular agreement will solve all obstacles, risk reduction measures can enhance American security by injecting a degree of stability into the space domain and promoting norms of responsible behavior in outer space.
Moreover, as the dominant space power and the country most affected by destabilizing developments in the space domain, the United States has strong incentives to lead such efforts. Otherwise, the rules governing the space domain may become fragmented or be shaped to serve very different interests than those of the United States. For example, since 2008 Russia and China have proposed a treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT). However, the treaty is vague in defining key concepts, including weapons, and would not address the development of ground-based ASAT weapons that Russia and China are actively developing and testing. More broadly, even if other states do not promote initiatives counter to US interests, a lack of effective measures could make outer space increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
In seeking solutions, US policymakers should be mindful of the tradeoffs and opportunities associated with various kinds of risk reduction efforts. The United States faces important choices: should it pursue legally binding measures or non-binding ones? Should it pursue its goals unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally? And with which actors?
This analysis identifies risk reduction measures that the United States can pursue to advance its interests in space. We propose that the United States build on the momentum generated by its recent commitment to forgo destructive ASAT tests and pursue a non-binding multilateral ban on them. We also suggest that the United States seek to expand the membership and scope of the Artemis Accords—an agreement that seeks to establish common principles for responsible space exploration, as part of NASA’s Artemis program to return humans to the moon. Last, we recommend that the United States promote a private sector code of conduct for responsible behavior in the space domain.
The US can pursue risk reduction measures to advance its interests in space
This article is organized as follows. First, we discuss the growing threats to American interests in space. We then identify a series of considerations for conceptualizing various approaches to governing outer space, including the number and type of actors involved and the legal status of the agreement. Last, based on this analysis, we develop options for pragmatic steps for risk reduction measures that can promote stability and a more sustainable space environment.
Egel, N., & Lincoln Hines, R. (2022). Governing the Final Frontier: Risk Reduction in Outer Space. The Washington Quarterly, 45(4), 27–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2149168
