This seminar introduces students to game theory and other formal theories of political choice. Our emphasis will be on how models of political choice apply to common problems in politics. This will help students think about politics analytically, objectively, and deeply. No prior knowledge of the subject is needed, but I will assume that students have sufficient aptitude for abstract reasoning and enough high school algebra to move at a fairly quick pace.

The course begins with a brief introduction to discrete games (a theory of strategic choice applied to games with discrete choices). We illustrate the theory using several examples, then apply it more extensively to problems in international diplomacy and voter turnout. We will then examine repeated games and their effects on cooperation. The next section of the course introduces students to spatial voting models and how they help us understand government spending. We will further study the anomalies of multiple dimensional spatial voting models, such as McKelvey’s Chaos Theorem (a wild but fascinating discovery), then apply these models to stopping rules in committees, the Russian Duma, and the alleged vote trade in the election of 1824. In the end, students will understand some of the most advance theories of strategy and political choice. They will also gain the tools needed to approach problems objectively and “scientifically.”

Grading

Your grade will consist of three homework assignments, a mid-term exam, and a final exam. I expect students to attend all classes and assume that you are mature enough to understand what happens when you miss a class. Ask another student for notes if you miss a class. I will not give out notes nor put them on the web. However, all assignments will be on-line. Please look at my web page if you miss the day I hand out an assignment.

Although I generally think of 90-100 as an A, 80-90 as a B, etc., since the university moved to a plus minus system, your overall grade for the course will be based upon the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>92 or above</td>
<td>A–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B+</td>
<td>88-89.99</td>
<td>B–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>82-87.99</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+</td>
<td>78-79.99</td>
<td>C–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>72-77.99</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+</td>
<td>68-69.99</td>
<td>D–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>62-67.99</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>59.99 or below</td>
<td>F</td>
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</tbody>
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Home Work Assignments

Each home work assignment is worth 10% of your grade. These assignment will help you practice the analytic skills taught in the course and help you prepare for the exams. Assignments will be posted on-line roughly one week before they are due.
Exams
The preponderance of your grade comes from a mid-term exam and a final exam. Both may contain multiple choice, fill in the blank, problem solving, and essay type questions worth 30% of your grade each. The idea is to give you multiple types of questions to evaluate your understanding of the material, not your aptitude for a particular type of test question. You will be given a review sheet for each. The final is not cumulative. Note: up to 1/5 of each exam may come from the readings not covered in lecture, so please read the assignments.

Extra Credit
Occasionally, I will assign in class games for additional points. These games are designed to help students think about the differences between actual behavior and game theoretic behavior first hand. However, there are no make-ups for these demonstrations, so please attend regularly.

Make-ups
Homework assignments require a fair amount of analysis time. Please plan ahead to avoid turning them in late. Late assignments will be lowered one letter grade for every working day they are late and will not be accepted later than two working days after the due date. If an assignment is late, it would be a good idea to stick it under my office door (Baldwin 408) as soon as possible to avoid any unnecessary late penalties. Grades are lowered for every working day they are late, not every class day they are late.

If you miss the midterm exam for a good reason, pre-approved by me, you will be allowed to complete a make-up midterm on Tuesday, March 3 at 4:00 pm, meeting in Baldwin 408. Please allow additional time in case we have to start late. THERE WILL BE NO OTHER TIME TO MAKE UP THE MID-TERM AND NO MAKE-UP FOR THE FINAL. It also should be noted that the make-up exam will be considerably more difficult than the regular mid-term exam and should be avoided. Please plan ahead.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Percent of Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOMEWORK 1 (two person games)</td>
<td>Jan 30</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMEWORK 2 (step-good games)</td>
<td>Feb 18</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDTERM EXAM</td>
<td>Feb 27</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMEWORK 3 (repeated games)</td>
<td>Mar 24</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMEWORK 4 (spatial voting)</td>
<td>Apr 23</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINAL EXAM</td>
<td>May 5</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Student Honesty
All academic work must meet the standards contained in “A Culture of Honesty.” Students are responsible for informing themselves about these standards before performing academic work. The penalties for academic dishonesty are severe and ignorance is not an acceptable defense. Also note that the course syllabus is a general plan for the course and that deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary.
Required Texts

We will read both theoretical and substantive works in this course which vary in length. Long assignments are generally more descriptive than short assignments and can be read fairly quickly. Short assignments are usually analytical and may require a second or third reading. Try working a few problems out on a sheet of paper as you go along. It will help. Remember, if you work hard and complete all the readings, this should be a very rewarding course.

Required readings will come from three sources: a text book, a course packet, and a couple of readings on-line. The first is available from the book store. The second is available at Bel Jeans (location described below). The third are marked on the day of the assignment below.


2. Course Packet, Bel-Jean Copy Center, 163 East Broad Street, (706)548-3648 (between Lumpkin and College on Broad street, near the arches). Required. These readings are marked with a “CP” below.

Schedule of Topics and Readings

I. DISCRETE GAMES

Jan 7

Introduction & Foundations of Theory

Two-Person, Sequential Games

Jan 9-16

*Dixit and Skeath, Ch 2, “How to Think about Strategic Games.”
*Dixit and Skeath, Ch 3, “Games with Sequential Moves.”

Two-Person, Simultaneous Games

Jan 21-23

*Dixit and Skeath, Ch 4, “Simultaneous-Move Games: Discrete Strategies.”

Application: Government Reform

Jan 28


Application: Marbury v. Madison

Jan 30


Incomplete Information Games

Feb 4-6

*Dixit and Skeath, Ch 8, “Uncertainty and Information.”
*Dixit and Skeath, Ch 14, “Brinkmanship: the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
Step-Good Games and Voter Turnout
Feb 11-13  *Cain and Dougherty, “Suppressing Shays’ Rebellion.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, CP.

The Political Machines
Feb 18-20  *Reichley, Ch 7 & 10, The Life of the Parties, CP.
    *Jac Heckelman, “The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates,” Public Choice, CP.

Feb 25  *Catch-Up and Review.

Feb 27  MIDTERM EXAM

Repeated Games
Mar 3  *Dixit and Skeath, Ch 11, “The Prisoners’ Dilemma and Repeated Games.”


Mar 5-13  No Class! Invited Talk & Spring Break.

Mar 17-26  *Dixit and Skeath, Ch 11, “The Prisoners’ Dilemma and Repeated Games,” cont.

II. SPATIAL VOTING MODELS

The Median Voter Theorem
Mar 26-31  *Hinich and Munger, Ch 2, “The Spatial Model of Downs and Black,” Analytical Politics, CP.
    *Stewart, Analyzing Congress, Chapter 1 (pp. 3-22), CP.

Application: Representative Democracy and Fiscal Policy

Estimating Ideal Points

Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models
Apr 9-14  *Stewart, Analyzing Congress, Chapter 1 (pp. 22-40), CP.
    *Hinich and Munger, Ch 3, “Two Dimensions: Elusive Equilibrium,” Analytical Politics, CP.
Application: Stopping Rules in Committees
April 16 class in Baldwin 480 (Pinnacle Room)


Applications: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention & Vote Trading in the Election of 1824

Apr 23  *Dougherty and Heckelman, “A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State,” American Political Science Review, CP.
*Jeffery Jenkins and Brian Sala, “The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824” American Journal of Political Science, CP.

Apr 28  *Catch-up and Review

May 5  FINAL EXAM (12:00-2:00 pm, same location)