Coordination, not Coercion: Party Policy Committees and Collective Action in the United States Senate

Michael H. Crespin  
Associate Professor  
University of Texas at Dallas  
michael.crespin@utd.edu

Anthony Madonna  
Assistant Professor  
University of Georgia  
ajmadonn@uga.edu

Joel Sievert  
Ph.D. Student  
University of Georgia  
sievert1@uga.edu

Nathaniel Ament-Stone  
Law Student  
University of Chicago  
namentstone@uchicago.edu

October 16, 2012*

*The authors would like to thank Mark Owens, Daniel Helmick, Andrew Wills and Matthew Jennings for their help in collecting the data. Additional thanks to Ryan Bakker, Jamie L. Carson, Keith Dougherty, Frances Lee, Burdett Loomis, Steve Smith, Gregory Wawro for comments and to Andrea Campbell and Keith Poole for Senate Roll Call Data. Finally, the authors would like thank Donald Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office for his insight. All errors remain the authors.
Abstract

In this paper, we seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intra-party coordination influenced levels of party unity in the United States Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. On one side, scholars have argued that the policy committees were largely ineffective. Others have suggested the committees served as focal points that facilitated the parties’ abilities to coordinate legislative strategy on the floor. Our findings are consistent with this, suggesting that the establishment of party policy committees in the Senate helped majority party leaders coordinate on a legislative agenda, leading to high levels of party unity on procedural votes.
On February 25, 2010, the United States Senate began consideration of H.R. 4691, the Temporary Extension Act of 2010. The measure sought to continue unemployment insurance benefits, subsidize health premiums for uninsured and extend current Medicare payment rates (Hulse and Pear 2010; Stanton 2010). H.R. 4691 passed the House via voice vote and was expected to quickly pass the Senate as well. However, on February 26th, Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) objected to a unanimous consent agreement that would have allowed the measure to pass that day.

Bunning’s decision had significant repercussions for both parties. Due to the chamber’s scheduling rules, majority-party Democrats were unable to force a vote on the measure until the following week (Hulse 2010a). Republicans were also put in a difficult position by Bunning’s decision to obstruct a fairly popular measure in a tough economic climate. They attempted to convince Bunning to drop his objections to the bill while distancing themselves from his actions (Pierce 2010).\(^1\) Despite intense criticism from opposing and fellow partisans, Bunning was able to delay the passage of the measure for over a week, forcing thousands of federal employees to be temporally furloughed (Stanton 2010).\(^2\)

Senator Bunning’s obstruction of H.R. 4691 conforms to the popular perception that lawmaking in the United States Senate is highly individualistic. Despite serious concerns that his actions could severely damage their brand name, Senate Republicans were unable to persuade Bunning to drop his objections and allow a popular measure to be quickly enacted. The rules of the Senate allow individual senators like Bunning or a small minority of the chamber from either party to obstruct the legislative process. Because members can filibuster (Binder and Smith 1997; Koger 2010; Wawro and Schickler 2006), object to unanimous

---

\(^1\)On March 1, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) took to the floor on behalf of “numerous” other Republicans in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Bunning to drop his objections (Pierce 2010). Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) noted that Bunning was “one senator” and did not “represent the position of the caucus (Hulse 2010b).”

\(^2\)H.R. 4691 passed the Senate on March 2, 2010 with broad bipartisan support by a vote of 78 to 19. Bunning argued that his opposition to the measure was rooted in his opposition to the costs being added to the deficit as emergency spending (Hulse and Pear 2010). Ultimately, he dropped his objections in exchange for a recorded vote on a substitute amendment he sponsored (Stanton 2010).
consent agreements (Ainsworth and Flathman 1995; Smith and Flathman 1989), propose legislation at virtually any point through the lack of a germaneness requirement (Smith and Gamm 2002) or place anonymous holds on bills (Evans and Lipinski 2005) it is difficult for the majority party to control the Senate floor. Despite this unfavorable procedural environment, scholars of political parties have observed high levels of party success on the Senate floor (Cox and McCubbins 2001; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011).

In this paper, we seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intra-party coordination influenced levels of party unity in the United States Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. On one side, scholars have argued that the policy committees were largely ineffective (Bone 1956). Others have suggested the committees served as focal points that facilitated the parties’ abilities to coordinate legislative strategy on the floor (Caro 2002; Truman 1959).

To arbitrate between these competing accounts, we adopt a two-pronged approach. First, we examine Congress at the vote-level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be classified as “party unity votes” before and after the establishment of the policy committees. We argue that if the policy committees led to more intra-party coordination, then we should observe a greater proportion of party unity votes on procedural issues after the committees were established. We find there was little difference in the proportion of party unity votes depending on vote-type prior to the creation of the Senate policy committees. After the committees were established, the estimated probability of a party unity vote for procedural questions was roughly 16 percentage points higher than for substantive questions. Notably, these changes do not appear to be present in the House – which did not create a companion set of policy committees.

Second, we employ a micro-level analysis by examining individual senators’ procedural party support scores. Excluding Southern Democrats, we find that members of the majority party were more likely to have higher levels of procedural unity after the adoption of policy
committees. The evidence at both the vote and member-levels is consistent with the argument that the policy committees facilitated intra-party coordination on procedural matters. This heightened degree of party unity on the Senate floor began almost 30 years before the return of party power in the post-reform House (Rohde 1991). Notably, this increase in coordination did nothing to weaken individuality in the Senate; however, it did allow the majority party to use floor time more efficiently.

The next section discusses the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act and Senate policy committees in greater detail. We then outline our theory that policy committees acted as a catalyst in the solving intra-party coordination problems. Finally, we provide descriptive evidence before fitting several models to demonstrate changes in party support. We conclude by discussing our results in light of existing literature on individualism in the Senate and the rise of the conservative coalition.

Party Policy Committees and the Legislative Reorganization Act

On August 2, 1946, President Harry S. Truman signed the Legislative Reorganization Act into law, dubbing it “one of the most significant advances in the structure of Congress since its establishment (Byrd 1988, 548).” The President’s signature marked the end of intense debate over the best way to reform the United States Congress. Scholars had expressed concerns over the legislature’s loss of authority to the executive branch, the fragmented jurisdiction of the committee system, insufficient staffing and travel allowances for members, the growing congressional workload and the weakness of political parties – among other issues (Davidson 1990; Waggoner 1946). In early 1945, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was established in order to investigate reform proposals. Nearly a year later, 

---

3A formal discussion of this issue was underway by 1941. In that year, the American Political Science Association formed a committee to investigate problems with the United States Congress. The committee – under the leadership of Professor George B. Galloway – produced a report in 1942 that outlined a number of reforms (Byrd 1988; Matthews 1981).
the committee submitted 37 recommended congressional reforms.4

One of the most controversial of the committee’s recommendations was the creation of policy committees for the majority and minority parties. In an article written for the *New York Times*, Senator Robert La Follette, Jr. (R-WI) stated that the “policy-making in Congress is splintered and uncoordinated,” and the new committees will “coordinate the legislative program,” and were “designed to help crystallize the determination of party policy on major issues and to promote party responsibility for the performance of platform promises (La Follette Jr. 1946).” Specifically, the original Senate resolution called for “a policy committee, consisting of seven members, for the formulation of over-all legislative policy of the respective parties (S. 2177, sec. 244(a) 1946).” Observers had long complained about the lack of “unity of command in Congress (Ritchie 1997, 3).” As such, the provision sought to create committees that facilitated partisan coordination and increase the parties abilities to sheppard an agenda through both chambers (Gamm and Smith 2002). This, supporters hoped, would further serve to increase partisan accountability by letting the people understand each party’s position on major issues (Heller 1945). Based on these observations, it seems the intent of the Act was clear, to increase the ability of the parties to coordinate on legislative activities. What is debatable, however, is the effect afterwards.

Debate over the Legislative Reorganization Act began in the Senate on June 6. It would pass 49 to 16 just four days later; with the policy committee provisions attached. Navigating the bill through the House proved much more difficult. Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) found the creation of majority and minority party policy committees objectionable.5 This objection was likely rooted in Rayburn’s unwillingness to weaken his substantial influence in setting

4 Perhaps the most ambitious proposed reform sought to streamline the committee systems in both chambers. In doing so, the number of Senate standing committees was to be reduced from 33 to 13 and the 48 committees in the House were combined into 19. Other recommended changes included reforming the budget process, increased funding for committee staff, a pay-raise for members and changes in scheduling for committee and floor action (Schneider et al. 2003).

5 The House debate also featured a substantial amount of debate over the inclusion of a pay raise and pension plan for members. House members were concerned about how voting for such a provision would be seen by their constituents. Ultimately, the chamber adopted an amendment dropping the base salary from 15,000 dollars, as specified by the Senate bill, to 12,000 dollars.
the chamber’s agenda (Galloway 1946; Ritchie 1997; Schneider et al. 2003). Additionally, the procedural uncertainty within the chamber further increased the speaker’s role in the House (Byrd 1988). In contrast, since no individual senator had the same powers as the Speaker, the formation of the policy committees was likely viewed as less of a threat. As a result, the policy committee provisions were dropped from the House bill when it was finally passed nearly six weeks later.

The House’s decision to exclude the policy committees generated significant criticism. The Washington Post noted that the policy committees were the primary mechanism by which reformers thought to centralize party responsibility and increase coordination with the executive. It lamented it as a “critical loss” and blamed Rayburn for its defeat.\footnote{See “Stripped Reform Bill,” The Washington Post, July 20, 1946. Congressman Everett Dirksen (R-IL) objected on the claim that Rayburn was responsible for the exclusion of this provision. He claimed the editorial was “an unconscionable distortion of the facts” and the decision to remove the policy committees was made by the entire joint committee in order to secure the bill’s passage (Congressional Record, 79th Congress, July 25, 1946, 11047).} Galloway (1946) argued that Rayburn’s decision would appear to political laymen as “an astonishing piece of political piracy” and noted that news articles characterized it as a “a travesty on the democratic process.”\footnote{See Byrd (1988) on this point as well.} Rather than send the bill to conference, the Senate concurred with the House amendments. Disagreement would likely have been fatal for the Act as many House members had already left Washington (Galloway 1946). After passing the bill, the Senate established policy committees separately.

### Conflicting Views on the Policy Committees

The limited scholarly research on the Senate’s policy committees has reached conflicting conclusions regarding their effect. Political scientists have noted that the two parties have used and structured the policy committees in different manners. For example, the Republican Policy Committee chair was traditionally someone other than the formal party leader. Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) chaired the committee from its inception through 1952 when
he subsequently took on the position of majority leader.\footnote{Taft had served as the chair of the Republican Steering Committee – established just two years before. He utilized the Policy Committee chairmanship as the basis for his leadership within the chamber (Schickler 2001). In particular, Taft was able to use the committee to agree upon legislative strategies with his more moderate, senior colleague, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) (Byrd 1988). Even before the establishment of the committee, Taft had a reputation for being a vocal conservative. His propensity for making speeches was frequently criticized by Senate Democrats. For example, Senator Thomas Connally (D-TX) mocked Taft’s many speeches by noting that “I like to keep up with the Senator from Ohio, but he makes so many speeches that I have not time to read all of them. I am charmed by the Senator from Ohio here in the Chamber, and then I got down to my room at night and buy the afternoon newspaper, and read a thrilling speech in the afternoon newspaper; and then at night, when I am undertaking to get some musical or art of religious program, I am interrupted by hearing the Senator from Ohio on the radio (\textit{Congressional Record}, 76th Congress, March 20, 1940, 3148).”}

The Republicans met regularly, and often used the committee to coordinate on their legislative priorities.\footnote{In his biography of Taft, Patterson (1972) focuses on Taft’s use of the Policy Committee as an institution of procedural coordination. He details how Taft went to the GOP Policy Committee to hash out the procedural strategy of passing Taft-Hartley as an omnibus bill before bringing it to the committee and then the floor. In another instances, he notes that Taft persuaded “the GOP policy committee to avoid unnecessary battles over presidential appointments (Patterson 1972, 337).”} In contrast, the Democratic Policy Committee was chaired by the party’s floor leader.\footnote{Membership on both committees also varied by party and over time. The Republicans on the Committee tended to be part of the leadership. Starting with the 83rd Congress (1953-1955), two-thirds of the committee chairs were allowed on the committee and soon afterwards the party tried to achieve a regional balance and at times allowed members who were up for reelection to join the committee. Meanwhile, the Democratic leader selected junior members to serve on the committee and only filled vacancies as the original members left the Senate (Peterson 2005).} And while the Republicans met regularly, the Democrats did not, and their meetings were much less formal (Bone 1956; Davidson 1990; Truman 1959; Robinson 1954). This lack of uniformity has led scholars to question the effectiveness of the policy committees in altering policy outcomes.

Bone (1956) notes that Majority Leader Alben Barkely (D-AR), who served as chair of the Democratic Policy Committee in the 79th (1945-1947) and 80th Congress (1947-1949) made little use of the committee. Griffith and Valeo (1975) argue the Democrats did not successfully utilize the Policy Committee to facilitate the passage of partisan agendas until 1963, well after the committees were established. Additional scholarship concurs, suggesting the committees had only a marginal effect on party coordination in the Senate (Davidson 1990; Robinson 1954).
In perhaps the most detailed look at the question, Truman (1959) found little support for the thesis that party policy committees led to a high degree of substantive voting cohesion. Specifically, he argued that high levels of disagreements on substantive issues existed amongst the policy committee members in the 81st Senate (1955-1957). However, in contrast, he argued that dismissing the formation of the committees as formalities would be “somewhat too hasty (Truman 1959, 127).” He concluded by suggesting the policy committees play in an important role in allowing parties to structure debate and proved to be important “communications centers (Truman 1959, 131).”

Additional work has built on Truman’s argument. In a careful study of the Republican Policy Committee minutes, Senate historian Donald Ritchie (1997) argued that while the committees possessed no formal powers to coerce voting behavior, during the early years of the committee it strived to, “build party discipline,” “determine consensus within the party on issues,” “reconcile conflicting views among Republican senators to maintain party harmony,” “consider questions of floor strategy,” “devis[e] strategies to promote those policies,” and “to preserve party unity (Ritchie 1997, 15-38).” Over time, these responsibilities have increased (Peterson 2005; Kelly 1995). Consistent with this, Cooper (1988, 282) notes that “too often the significance of the Senate policy committees is unduly minimized. In fact, they have performed important service, educational and communications functions.”

Finally, Caro (2002) argues that political scientists have underestimated the efficacy of the early Democratic Policy Committees as agenda-setting institutions. While the Democratic Policy Committee never formally listed its functions, he argues that its establishment facilitated Lyndon Johnson’s ability to structure outcomes on the Senate floor. Johnson used his position as Democratic Party whip to inform the policy committees when certain bills would be reported out of committee, and which senators were planning to offer amendments. Specifically, (Caro 2002, 389) notes that “[W]hen the committee turned to scheduling, all of a sudden the discussions were no longer as haphazard as they had been in the past. Johnson could report what amendments were going to be introduced, and who was planning to speak
for or against them, and how heated, and how long, the discussion on each amendment was likely to be.” He concludes by arguing that the Democratic Policy Committee was an effective tool used by the party to coordinate on certain issues and kill others.

Party Coordination and Collective Action in the Senate

In the United States House, the chambers’ strong central leader – the Speaker – has used the Rules Committee to set the agenda and keep unwanted legislation from coming to the floor since the late 19th century (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2001, 2002, 2005). Party leadership positions in the United States Senate developed much more slowly. The first formal floor leadership position was established in 1911 (Gamm and Smith 2002). However, even after their formal emergence, majority floor leaders lacked the procedural tools necessary to manage a full party agenda.\textsuperscript{11}

Building off of the work of Caro (2002) and Cooper (1988), we argue that the adoption of policy committees in the Senate was needed to help the party leaders coordinate on which legislative priorities to bring to the floor. While this certainly does not prevent minority obstruction, the committees allowed the parties to pull intra-party disagreements off the floor into the meeting rooms. Since collective action problems become easier to solve as the number of actors decreases (Olson 1965), they may be overcome in the relatively small Senate with a minimal set of tools such as meetings to hash out floor strategy.\textsuperscript{12} If we are correct and disagreement was pulled off the floor, then we should observe higher levels of party unity voting – especially amongst majority party members.

The idea that the Senate leadership strives to solve coordination problems is not new. Gamm and Smith (2002) argue that if members are in agreement about an issue, then someone must solve the coordination problem to choose a strategy that will help the party achieve

\textsuperscript{11}See Den Hartog and Monroe 2011 for a more thorough discussion of agenda control in the Senate.

\textsuperscript{12}This is consistent with Lee (2009, 13), who argues that senators can solve collective action problems by simply meeting around a “common lunch table.” To us, the policy committees provided a setting for senators to discuss policy face-to-face.
the goal. As the workload increased during the first half of the 20th century and senators were laboring on more issues (Davidson 1990) it is likely that coordination between even like-minded partisans became more difficult. Moreover, the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 ensured that senators would be reelected independent of the state parties. This likely further strained intraparty coordination, making the establishment of the party policy committees more of a necessity.

Increased coordination does not imply that leaders can force members to act against their will, only that if members are in agreement, the leadership can coordinate activities between party members. If enough party members were unified on an issue, they would frequently present it to the full caucus. They could then use the committees to develop a legislative plan and then disseminate that plan to the other party members. If the party agreed, it would then move forward. Although the Democrats and Republicans did not run the policy committees in the same fashion, they both met to agree on what items to put on the agenda and what to leave off.

Once the majority comes to some degree of consensus, how could they advance their legislative agenda? In order to pass legislation in the Senate, majority party leaders must negotiate unanimous consent agreements (Sinclair 1989; Smith and Flathman 1989; Ainsworth and Flathman 1995) or utilize other, more time-consuming procedural tactics. These include – but are not limited to – utilizing non-debatable tabling motions to block discussion on unwanted amendments, employing cloture motions to overcome a minority filibuster and taking advantage of the majority leader’s right to priority recognition in conjunction with a simple majority motion to proceed.\textsuperscript{13} Maintaining party unity on these procedural votes is essential.

\textsuperscript{13}The right of first recognition was established through a ruling by Vice President John C. Garner in 1937 (Lynch and Madonna 2009). It specifies that if multiple senators request recognition at the same time “priority of recognition shall be accorded to the Majority and Minority Leader, the majority manager and the minority manager, in that order (Gold 2004, 40).” Scholars have pointed out the important implications it has had on policy-making in the Senate. Byrd (1988) argues that the right of first recognition has since become the most important power enjoyed by the majority leader. Scholars and other majority leaders have echoed this point. Gold (2004, 40) points to a biography of former majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT), which argued that the right allowed the leader to “outflank any other senator in offering motions or amendments, and to the most important voice, rarely overruled, in shaping the nature and timing of Senate
to keep legislation from unraveling and getting bogged down with additional amendments added late in the legislative process (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011).

Maintaining unity on certain types of procedural votes should be easier compared to substantive votes since they may be less visible to constituents (Arnold 1990; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011). If procedural unity breaks down, the agenda setting advantage will disappear. Thus, in order for a party to enjoy legislative success, a high degree of party unity will be needed on procedural votes and solving cooperation problems must be accomplished to guide a piece of legislation to a successful final passage vote. If procedural mechanisms can be used to structure the agenda correctly, then members will have more freedom to vote with their district on final passage. Given this, we should expect to observe a difference in the levels of party unity when we compare legislative voting on procedural and substantive matters before and after the formation of the Senate policy committees. Thus, our key hypothesis suggests that before the policy committees were able to coordinate activity, we expect to find little difference in party unity when comparing procedural voting with substance. However, afterwards, we expect to see an increase in party unity on procedural votes but not necessarily on substance.

This does not imply that the Senate will be as successful as the House in terms of enacting a partisan agenda. While several scholars have uncovered evidence of low majority roll-rates in the upper chamber (Campbell, Cox and McCubbins 2002; Gailmard and Jenkins 2007), it is important to note that this success is measured using observed outcomes on the floor. For example, when asked whether the House should initiate the passage of a controversial Health Care Act in 2010, Representative Anthony Weiner (D-NY) responded negatively, arguing that “Fool me once, shame on me; fool me 290 times, shame on you.” Weiner was referencing the 290 bills already passed by the House that had not been considered in the business.” It guarantees that the majority leader will be the first member allowed to propose a motion to proceed, to report a unanimous consent agreement or offer an amendment (Gamm and Smith 2002; Beth et al. 2009). These powers are critical in order for the majority leader to manage the Senate’s floor time effectively.
upper chamber.

Our theory suggests that policy committees provide party leaders with better information as they select which proposals to bring forward to the floor. This way minimize intra-party divisions and avoid suffering embarrassing public defeats on the floor. It does not, however, allow them to overcome minority party or individual obstruction – should members be committed to engaging in those tactics (Koger 2010). While House leaders can employ the Rules Committee to pass almost all of the parties’ proposals, Senate leaders utilize coordination to determine which proposals it can bring to the floor and pass – and which it needs to leave off the agenda.

Changes in Party Unity Voting

What evidence would suggest a change in the role of Senate parties? A basic one would be an increase in party unity votes. Increased intra-party coordination should allow the majority party leadership to better formulate and advance their agenda through the chamber. This, we anticipate, should lead to a greater proportion of party unity votes per Congress. We define a party unity vote as one where a majority of one party votes against a majority of the other party. If the parties were coordinating their efforts after the creation of the policy committees, then we would expect to see an increase in party unity voting after the passage of the act during 79th Congress (1945-47). Figure 1 displays the percent of party unity votes in the Senate from the 45th Congress (1877-79) through the 108th Congress (2003-2004). In the following figures, we fit simple regression lines for the pre and post-LRA periods for illustrative purposes.

[Figure 1 Here]

Over the course of the entire time period, the degree of party unity declined. It reached a peak of 82% in the 47th Congress (1881-1883) and declined to a low of 33% during the

14 Measures of party unity were calculated using vote marginals available at www.voteview.com.
90th Congress (1967-68). However, if we look at levels of party unity before and after the 1946 reform, unity was on the decline until the 79th Congress (1945-1947). As expected, party unity appears to have declined sharply after the move towards direct election of the senators. The establishment of the policy committees in the 79th Congress (1945-1947) appears to have led to a slight uptick in the percentage of party unity votes. Although the change in unity following the reform is variable, it gives some indication as to the effect of the creation of the policy committees.

If the parties began to act more cohesively due to increased coordination, then we would expect to see an increase in unity on procedural votes rather than on substantive votes. Using a dataset created similar to Rohde (2004), we calculated the percentage of party unity votes for both procedural and substantive votes. Votes such as motions to table, cloture votes, motions to proceed and all other procedural votes are included in the procedure category. Votes on the final passage of bills, amendments, resolutions and conference reports make up the bulk of the substantive category.\footnote{These data were compiled by Andrea Campbell for the 45th-104th congresses and by the authors for the 105th-108th congresses.}

Figure 2 presents the percent of party unity votes for each of the two categories. Prior to the 79th Congress (1945-1947), there is no discernable difference between the levels of party unity between the two categories. However, after the 79th Congress (1945-1947), there is a striking change in the way members were voting on procedural matters but not much of a change for substantive votes. After the reforms, the percentage of substantive party unity votes still trended downward, although at a slower rate. In contrast, after the creation of the policy committees there was a marked increase in the percentage of procedural party unity votes compared to the previous few congresses. In the three congresses prior to the establishment of the policy committees, 54\% of procedural votes were party unity votes.
Immediately after the act the numbers increased to 69%, 83%, and 77% for procedural votes while the numbers for substance were lower.

While the difference between the two categories varies over the years, these data provide evidence that there was a change in the way the parties dealt with procedural matters. As such, it suggests that the parties in the Senate were acting in ways consistent with our argument that the policy committees allowed senators to coordinate on procedural votes. This is also consistent with Lee (2009, 73), who argues that party conflict on roll-call votes is reflective of partisan coordination.

It is possible that these changes in voting patterns are just coincidental and not related to the reforms. For example, it is certainly reasonable to think that the end of World War II would usher in an era of greater partisan conflict (Madonna 2011). However, if this were the case, one would expect to see a comparable increase in proportion of party unity votes on procedural issues within the House of Representatives. These data suggest this is not the case. In the ten years before the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act, the average proportion of party unity votes on procedural matters in the Senate was 57.17%. In the House, it was a comparable 56.78%. In the ten years preceding the Act’s adoption, Senate party unity on procedural votes shot up to 72.25%, while the House stayed virtually constant – 56.55%. Again, the House did not adopt the policy committees when the Senate did.

While the descriptive statistics are instructive, we can examine this relationship more fully by estimating probit models to examine the level of party unity on substantive and procedural votes. Again, our key hypothesis is that we should see more party unity votes on procedure following the establishment of the policy committees. Since we are arguing the parties are only coordinating on agenda setting, we do not expect to find a similar change on substantive votes. Our data is the universe of procedural and substantive roll-call votes in the Senate from the 64th Congress (1915-1917) to the 90th Congress (1967-1969).16 By limiting

---

16We exclude the small subset of nomination and impeachment votes
our time series to the post-Seventeenth Amendment and pre-Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, we minimize problems with confounding variables. Moreover, as Figure 1 illustrates, party unity increased in the Senate after the 1970 act, so our time series specification should bias against our hypothesis.

Our dependent variable is a binary variable coded 1 if the vote was a party unity vote, and 0 if otherwise. Our key independent variables include indicator variables for the type of vote cast. Of the 9,551 votes in our data, 2,015 were procedural and 7,536 were on substantive matters. We also include indicator variables for the issue content of a given vote. These variables were constructed using the issue codes provided by Keith Poole, which are available through his VoteView web site. Specifically, we include variables for the following issue areas: domestic economy, labor issues, civil rights, defense, social welfare, international affairs, and natural resources. These covariates help us control for any underlying differences or changes in the issue agenda across our sample (Madonna 2011). We also include congress-level fixed effects, which are not reported.

In order to test our hypotheses in a more systematic fashion we examine whether or not there is a structural break in the relationship between vote type and party unity before and after the adoption of the policy committees. The use of tests for structural breaks has been employed profitably in others studies of American political institutions to examine how key relationships change after a defined break point (McCarty 2009; Meinke 2008; Richards and Kritzer 2002). Tests for structural breaks can be thought of as a Chow-type test that examines whether or not the coefficient estimates for distinct subsets of the data vary systematically from the estimates obtained from a fully pooled model (Greene 2002). The formal test requires that we compute a likelihood ratio test comparing the combined log likelihoods of the models on subsets of the data (e.g. before and after the establishment of the policy committees) to the log likelihood for the fully pooled model.\footnote{The degrees of freedom for the resulting $\chi^2$ test are equal to the $k$ additional parameters that were estimated by estimating separate models for each time period.} We report the
estimates from the pre and post-LRA models and a test for a structural break in Table 1.

[Table 1 Here]

The results presented here provide further suggestive support for our hypotheses. First, the coefficient estimate for procedure is not statistically significant in the pre-LRA model, but it is positive and significant in the post-LRA model. The change in both magnitude and significance of the estimate provides direct evidence in support of our expectation that there would be increased coordination on procedural votes after the adoption of policy committees. While the estimates are informative, the effect can be seen more clearly by examining the difference between the predicted probability of a party unity vote for substantive and procedural votes. Prior to the establishment of the policy committees, the predicted probability of a party unity vote for procedural vote was approximately 2.4 percentage points higher than the predicted probability for a substantive vote. After the establishment of the policy committees, the estimated probability of a party unity vote for procedural questions was roughly 16 percentage points higher than for substantive questions.

Second, the estimates for the issue areas fit with the idea that changes in the issue agendas and the relative party unity on these issues explains the observed changes in party unity across the time period. Lastly, the test for a structural break is significant at conventional levels of significance. The rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural break give us further confidence in that the increased unity on procedural votes was at least in part a product of the adoption of policy committees.

While the model estimates and test for a structural break are informative, we can also consider the counterfactual of what party unity would have looked like after the LRA had there not been greater party unity on procedural votes. Specifically, we use simulations to examine how party unity might have looked if the probability of a party unity vote on procedural questions had remained statistically indistinguishable from substantive votes as it was before the LRA. The simulations we conducted proceeded as follows. We used the coefficient estimates from the Post-LRA model, but constrained the estimate for Procedure
to be zero. We then used the estimates and observed values for each case to calculated the probability of each vote being a party unity vote. Finally, we used these estimated probabilities to simulate 1,000 draws from a Binomial distribution for each vote where a 1 was a party unity vote and a 0 was not.

The simulation gave us an \( n \times 1,000 \) matrix of roll call votes, where \( n \) corresponded to the number of roll calls in a given Congress and the columns of each matrix corresponded to one hypothetical realization of that congress’s roll call votes. For example, in Table 2, the second column in our simulations of the 80th Congress (1947-1949) represent one possible realization of what the observed party unity votes would have looked like given the observed values of each observation and the corresponding parameter estimates with the estimate for Procedure constrained to be zero.\(^{18}\) From this matrix we were able to calculate the proportion of party votes for each of the 1,000 hypothetical realizations of a given congress. This resulted in a vector with 1,000 entries each of which corresponded to a simulated proportion of party unity votes. We then used this vector to calculated the first quartile, median, third quartile, and the proportion of simulations that were less than the observed level of party unity. These quantities are presented in Table 2.

[Table 2 Here]

The simulation results are instructive. First, there is no Congress for which the third quartile (fifth column) of simulated proportion of party unity votes is greater than the observed proportion of party unity votes (second column). Second, the observed party unity is greater than well over 90 percent of the simulated outcomes in three congresses and greater than 80 percent of the simulated outcomes in 10 of the 11 congresses. Lastly, the simulations suggest that the Senate would feature fewer party unity votes absent the establishment of the policy committees.

\(^{18}\)While we do not report the estimates for the congress fixed effects, they were used in our simulation. For example, all calculations of the linear predictor used to calculate the probabilities of a party unity vote used for simulations of the 84th Congress (1955-1957) include the parameter estimate for that congress’s fixed effect.
While the aggregate simulation results are supportive of our theoretical argument, they do not directly address how the adoption of policy committees impacted party unity on procedural questions. In order to assess this question more directly, we looked at the simulated party unity votes on only procedural votes. Specifically, we examined the difference between observed and simulated procedural party unity in each of the post-LRA congresses. The dots in Figure 3 represent the difference between the observed unity and the median procedural unity for that congress. The lines represented the difference between observed procedural unity and the 25th (upper bound) and 75th quartile (lower bound) of the simulated procedural unity.

The differences between observed and simulated party unity are quite striking. In seven of the eleven congresses, the difference between observed and the median simulation value is at or above 15 percentage points and in four of the congresses it is at or above 20 percentage points. Furthermore, the difference between the observed and median simulated value is always greater than zero. There is only one congress, the 87th, for which the lower bound approaches zero. In sum, the results in Figure 3 provide more direct evidence that absent the policy committees procedural unity would have been markedly lower.

[Figure 3 Here]

Examining Individual Party Support on Procedural Votes

In the preceding sections, we have presented vote-level evidence that suggests the adoption of party policy committees facilitated an increase in aggregate party-unity on procedural votes. In this section, we perform a member-level analysis to examine the impact the policy committees had on individual member’s support for the party on procedural votes. We argue that the establishment of party policy committees in the Senate facilitated leadership’s ability to coordinate with rank and file members, leading to greater success on the floor. Moreover, because scheduling legislation has become the prerogative of the majority leader,
we would expect this effect to be pronounced amongst majority party members. Members of the minority are forced to react to the majority's scheduling decisions, and while they can certainly obstruct certain measures, it should be more difficult to secure loyalty on votes. If this is the case, we expect that majority party members should exhibit higher individual levels of party-unity on procedural votes that occurred during congresses after the establishment of the committees.

To examine this question, we compiled percent party support scores on procedural votes for all members serving in the Senate after the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1914 (64th Congress) and prior to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (90th Congress). We examined all non-unanimous or near-unanimous roll call votes cast on procedures. We then tabulated the percentage of times a member voted in the same direction as a majority of his party. Members who voted in less than 20% of all procedural roll calls were omitted.

The raw data before and after the adoption of the Act provides some support for our hypotheses. Average individual support for the party on procedural matters from the 70th (1927-1929) to 79th Congress (1945-1947) was 73.1%. It jumps to 78.2% between the 80th (1947-1949) and 89th Congress (1965-1967). Excluding Southern Democrats – who frequently abandoned the party position on procedural votes in the post-reform era – the increase is even more pronounced, moving from 73.5% to 80.2%. Procedural unity was lower than substantive unity before the establishment of the committees, and lower afterwards.

To further examine the relationship between the Senate’s establishment of party policy committees and individual party-unity on procedural votes we examine individual senator’s level of party unity on procedural votes. The dependent variable, procedural support, is the percentage of times a member voted in the same direction as a majority of his party in a

---

19 See footnote 13 for a more detailed discussion of how the majority leader employs the right of first recognition to set the floor agenda.

20 This constituted less than 5% of all members. Votes with greater than 95% support were considered near-unanimous roll calls. As with the previous model, employing an extended time series strengthens our findings.
given Congress. Since our data consists of repeated measures on individuals there two issues we need to address when selecting a statistical model. First, we need to examine whether or not there are unit effects, which occurs when the mean value of the dependent variable varies across groups. Ignoring unit effects can lead to biased coefficient estimates (Greene 2002). In order to test for unit effects we first regressed an indicator variable for each senator on procedural unity and then used an ANOVA test to examine whether or not the means were different across groups. The results of the ANOVA test indicated that we can reject the null hypothesis that the means are the same across groups.

While there are several statistical models that account for unit effects, the estimates from some of these alternatives (e.g. fixed-effects models, Generalized Liner Mixed Models) cannot be interpreted as the average effect of an independent variable across the entire population. Since the estimates from these models are calculated with unit-specific effects included in the estimation, the estimates must be interpreted as the effect of a change in an independent variable on the same individual (Zorn 2001, 474). Since we are interested in the effect of the independent variables across all senators we use a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) regression model, which addresses repeated observations through the use of working correlation matrix for each cluster (Zorn 2001).\textsuperscript{21} The coefficient estimates from this model can be interpreted in the same manner as a traditional linear regression model.

Our main independent variable of interest is an indicator variable for whether or not a senator was a member of the majority party. Our expectation is that after the adoption of the LRA we should find higher levels of party unity among majority party members. We also include three additional control variables. First, the mid-20th century featured a number of heated Senate battles over civil rights legislation. As previously mentioned, this led to a pronounced split between Northern and Southern Democrats over usage of obstructive tactics like holds and filibusters. As such, we anticipate that Southern Democrats should have a far lower procedural support score and include a dichotomous variable coded one for

\textsuperscript{21}See Meinke (2008) for another example of the application of GEE regression models.
Southern Democrats. We also include an interaction between our indicators for majority party and minority party, which allows the effect of being in the majority party to vary for Southern and non-Southern senators when the Democrats are in the majority.

Second, the larger the majority party is relative to the minority, the less likely it would need to command high levels of party-unity to successfully pass legislation. Conversely, small majorities should need a high proportion of their partisans to pass their agenda. Given this, we anticipate that Senates’ with large majorities will be feature lower overall partisan support scores on procedural votes. We control for this using a variable accounting for the percent of all seats controlled by the majority party in a given Congress (Smith 2007). Lastly, we hypothesize that the primary effect of the policy committees was to allow party leaders to better coordinate with rank and file members on floor activity. Leaders themselves were likely already on board with the majority of their party. Members holding leadership positions in both parties are far more likely to support a majority of their party on procedural votes. Thus, we control for members that hold party leadership positions in the Senate. This included the majority caucus leader, the majority floor leader, the majority whip, the minority caucus leader, the minority floor leader and the minority whip.

As with the models of party unity votes, we estimate separate models for before and after the adoption of the LRA. One disadvantage of using GEE is that we cannot conduct many of the same model fit tests as we can with full likelihood models. As such we are not able to conduct the same type of formal structural break test we used with the Probit models above. However, the substantive differences in coefficient estimates across the two models give us confidence that estimating two models instead of a fully-pooled model is appropriate.

[Table 3 Here]

Results

Results from the GEE regression model are presented in Table 3. As expected, members of the majority party, with the exception of Southern Democrats, were more likely to have
higher levels of procedural unity after the adoption of policy committees. What is notable about the estimates is that the coefficient for majority party actually changes signs across the two models. Prior to the adoption of the party policy committees, party unity on procedural votes is estimated to be 3 percentage points lower on average for majority party members who were not Southern Democrats. After the adoption of the policy committees, however, party unity on procedural votes is estimated to be 3 percentage points higher on average for majority party members.

In the case of majority-party Southern Democrats our expectation that they would have lower levels of procedural unity are supported in the post-LRA model, but not in the pre-LRA model. Prior to the adoption of the LRA there is no statistically distinguishable difference between Southern and non-Southern Democrats when they are in the majority party. After the adoption of the LRA, majority party Southern Democrats party unity on procedural votes is estimated to be approximately 7 percentage points lower on average.\textsuperscript{22}

The remaining control variables all performed as expected. Party leaders were more supportive of the party’s position on procedural votes after the adoption of the LRA, but the estimate falls short of statistical significance in the pre-LRA model. Substantively the estimates for the post-LRA model indicate that the procedural party unity for leaders from both parties was approximately 3 percentage points higher on average. The majority seat share control is negative and significant. This suggests that when the majority controls a large number of seats, it can afford to advance legislative priorities that are not roundly supported by all members.

Our primary theoretical expectation was that after the establishment of party policy committees in the United States Senate we should see a significant increased in individual members support for their party on procedural votes. The results presented in Table 3 provide further support for this hypothesis. While the substantive effect appears small,\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{22}The estimated effect for majority party Southern Democrats is calculated by adding the coefficient estimate for majority party and the coefficient estimate for the interaction term.
the baseline level of support is high so any increase can be considered meaningful. This conforms to our argument stressing the role increased coordination can play in dictating policy outcomes. While individual members can significantly obstruct and kill measures in the chamber, coordination allows party leaders to pursue policies on the floor more efficiently.

Conclusion

Building off of work by Caro (2002); Truman (1959); Cooper (1988), we have argued the establishment of party policy committees in the Senate helped party leaders coordinate activities, advance a legislative agenda and maintain high levels of party unity on the floor by better structuring procedural votes. To explore this question, we examined changes in party unity voting at both the congress and individual member level.

Our results suggest that the establishment of the party policy committees served as an early catalyst for increased party unity on the floor. We observe an increase in the percentage of party unity votes just after the establishment of the committees. More strikingly our results indicate that the establishment of the committees led to a significant increase in the proportion of party unity votes on procedural issues. Specifically, our results demonstrate that after the establishment of the policy committees the estimated probability of a party unity vote for procedural questions was roughly 16 percentage points higher than for substantive questions. As Table 1 demonstrates, the test for a structural break was significant at conventional levels. Finally, the proportion of procedural votes that could be classified as a party unity vote in the House – which did not adopt the policy committees – did not appear to differ in the 10 years before and after the Act.

Next, the results from a Generalized Estimating Equation regression model of individual support for party positions on procedural votes presented in Table 3 are further suggestive of increased party coordination. Even when controlling for other important factors, the establishment of party policy committees appears to have led to a significant increase in majority party senators’ support for the party position on procedural issues. Indeed, our
results suggest that party unity on procedural matters increased by roughly 6 percent for non-Southern Democrat majority party members. These findings suggest that in terms of procedural matters, the majority party was successfully able to solve the coordination problems to vote together on the floor. These results are in some ways striking since the Senate has generally been characterized as a chamber where individuals, not cohesive groups, rule. We feel our results are not inconsistent with this notion since the creation of the policy committees did nothing to take away from an individual’s right to obstruct legislation. However, they did create a mechanism for coordinating activity where there already existed enough support for a particular item on the legislative agenda. This idea is supported by our examination of qualitative evidence such as the committee meeting minutes and the op-ed written by La Follette.

One could also question our results of increased party loyalty on procedural votes given that the time frame we study includes an era where the Southern Democrats frequently voted with the Republicans to stymie the more liberal Northern Democrats. Again, our results are consistent with previous research since we find the increase in party unity is largely contained to Senators from outside the South. It is also possible that the defection of Southerners encouraged increased unity amongst Northerners – but if this were the only factor contributing to changes in party unity voting, we would not expect to find the sharp break evident in Figure 2 immediately following the establishment of the policy committees.

Although more difficult to discern from the results presented here, we can speculate that these reforms may also have gone some way towards helping the parties to solve collective action problems once the coordination problem was solved. If enough party members could agree on a strategy, then convincing other partisans to come on board would have been easier with a central coordinating committee compared to members negotiating on their own. In sum, it seems that the Senate parties were able to use the policy committees to help coordinate activity largely with respect to procedural matters. While the focus of power within the institution may shift over time, this reform seemed to have sparked a rise in party
unity that continues through the current Congress.
References


Figure 1: Percent Party Unity in the Senate Pre and Post 1946 Reform

Note: Percent of party unity votes in the Senate from the 45th Congress (1877-79) through the 108th Congress (2003-2004).
Figure 2: Percent Party Unity in the Senate Pre and Post 1946 Reform: Substantive and Procedural Votes

Note: Percent of party unity votes in the Senate from the 45th Congress (1877-79) through the 108th Congress (2003-2004).
Table 1: Probit Models of Party Unity Votes, 1915-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-LRA</th>
<th></th>
<th>Post-LRA</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>95% C.I.</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>95% C.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>[-0.024, 0.143]</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>[0.303, 0.515]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Economy</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>[-0.196, 0.065]</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>[0.177, 0.461]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>[-0.824, 0.033]</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>[-0.304, 0.342]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
<td>[-0.696, 0.160]</td>
<td>-0.537</td>
<td>[-0.780, -0.301]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>[-0.446, 0.404]</td>
<td>-0.399</td>
<td>[-1.268, 0.411]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>-0.695</td>
<td>[-1.001, -0.393]</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>[0.358, 0.920]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>[0.098, 0.481]</td>
<td>-1.261</td>
<td>[-1.932, -0.692]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>[-0.535, 0.427]</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>[-0.354, 0.756]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>[0.488, 0.718]</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>[0.041, 0.368]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                |                          |                          |                          |
| N               | 5323                     | 4288                     |
| $\chi^2$ (df)   | 297.83 (16)              | 145.24 (10)              |
| Structural Break (df) | 116.78 (8) |

**Note:** Coefficients are estimates from a Probit model of the probability of a party unity vote. These data include the universe of all procedural and substantive roll call votes in the Senate from the 64th Congress (1915-1917) to the 90th Congress (1967-1969). Both models were estimated with Congress-level fixed effects, which are not reported here. The $\chi^2$ test is of the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for the fixed effects in each model were jointly zero.
### Table 2: Simulations of the Proportion of Party Unity Votes per Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>&lt; Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80th Congress (1947-1949)</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Congress (1949-1951)</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd Congress (1951-1953)</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd Congress (1953-1955)</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th Congress (1955-1957)</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Congress (1957-1959)</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Congress (1959-1961)</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Congress (1961-1963)</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Congress (1963-1965)</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th Congress (1965-1967)</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Congress (1967-1969)</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Each vote in a given Congress was simulated 1,000 times from a Binomial distribution based on the estimated probability of that vote being a party unity vote, which resulted in an $n \times 1,000$ matrix with $n$ corresponding to the number of roll call votes and each column representing a hypothetical observation for a given congress. We calculated the proportion of party unity votes in each of these 1,000 simulated congresses; the median and interquartile range of the simulated party unity for each congress are reported above.
Figure 3: Difference Between Observed and Simulated Procedural Unity

Note: The dots represent the difference between the observed unity and the median procedural unity for that congress. The lines represented the difference between observed procedural unity and the 25th (upper bound) and 75th quartile (lower bound) of the simulated procedural unity.
Table 3: GEE Regression Models of Individual Support on Procedural Votes, 1915-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-LRA</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
<th>Pre-LRA</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>[-0.044, -0.007]</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>[0.018, 0.049]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>[-0.030, 0.027]</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>[-0.034, 0.029]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leadership</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>[-0.011, 0.078]</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>[0.017, 0.053]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern x Majority Party</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>[-0.062, 0.016]</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>[-0.135, -0.063]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Seat Share</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>[-0.246, -0.034]</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>[-0.466, -0.216]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>[0.812, 0.940]</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>[0.911, 1.061]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 1640  1095
Clusters: 393 252
\(\chi^2\) (df): 27.16 (5) 82.39 (5)

Note: Coefficients are estimates from a GEE regression model of individual senator’s party unity on procedural votes. The data includes the all senators who served in the 64th Congress (1915-1917) to the 90th Congress (1967-1969). Both models were estimated with an exchangeable correlation structure (see Zorn 2001, 473) clustered on the individual senator.